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We study the effect of asset tangibility on corporate financing and investment decisions. Financially
constrained firms benefit the most from investing in tangible assets because those assets help relax
constraints, allowing for further investment. Using a dynamic model, we characterize this effect –
which we call firm-level credit multiplier – and show how asset tangibility increases the sensitivity
of investment to Tobin’s Q for financially constrained firms. Examining a large sample of manufacturers
over the 1971-2005 period as well as simulated data, we find support for our theory’s tangibility–investment
channel. We further verify that our findings are driven by firms’ debt issuance activities. Consistent
with our empirical identification strategy, the firm-level credit multiplier is absent from samples of
financially unconstrained firms and samples of financially constrained firms with low spare debt capacity.
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The interplay between real and nancial decisions is a central issue in corporate nance research.
Accordingly, a large body of literature examines when rms should invest and how they should
nance their projects. The literature, however, often fails to appreciate the impact of contracting
frictions on rms' ability to raise funds for investment. As a result, the investment process is
generally taken as exogenous to rms' nancial status and nancing decisions.
Financing frictions manifest themselves in many dierent ways. They typically make it harder
for rms to raise fairly-priced funds to nance their projects. As a result, the availability of nanc-
ing | rather than the availability of investment opportunities | drives rms' investment spending.
Some of the most commonly observed nancing frictions stem from the limited enforceability of
contracts, especially in poor states of the world. Evidence suggests that rms strategically default
on their contractual obligations when liquidation values are too low to keep investors committed to
termination (Gilson et al. (1990) and Altman (1991)). Theoretical models recognize this problem
and characterize nancing arrangements that commit investors to costly termination outcomes (see
Harris and Raviv (1990) and Bolton and Scharfstein (1990)). Although they vary in their design,
the element that makes these contracts enforceable has a common real-world counterpart: the sal-
ability or \tangibility" of the company's assets.1 The tangibility of corporate assets is not only tied
to the rm's investment process (asset tangibility is a function of the rm's line of business and
capital accumulation process), but also to the rm's ability to raise external funds.
This paper explores an inherent attribute of the rm | the tangibility of its operating assets |
to characterize an endogenous relation between rms' real and nancial decisions in the presence
of nancing imperfections. The tangibility of a rm's assets aects its ability to pledge collateral,
which serves as creditors' \enforceable" outside option in contract renegotiations. As such, asset
tangibility reduces debtors' incentive to default strategically, enlarging the rm's debt capacity.
While variants of the asset tangibility{investment channel have been described in prior work in
macroeconomics (see Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Bernanke et al. (2000)), the idea has not been
articulated in a rm-level setting. The extant literature lacks a theory with implications for cross-
sectional investment as well as empirical tests for the real eects of contract enforceability frictions.
We argue that rms that face nancing frictions can benet the most from the larger debt
capacity that is created by tangible assets. In particular, access to more (or cheaper) credit allows
rms to invest more without resorting to costly external equity or public unsecured debt. We
show that the additional investment | in tangible assets | further relaxes constraints, albeit at
a diminishing rate. In this way, investment is amplied by a nancing feedback of asset tangibility
that arises endogenously in the presence of contracting frictions. Our analysis formalizes the mech-
anism through which asset tangibility amplies the impact of shocks to the rm's opportunity set
1Hereinafter, the term \asset tangibility" is generally adopted and meant to summarize the liquidation value and
ease of redeployment of a rm's capital from the perspective of outside creditors in the event of default.
1onto the rm's investment and nancing across time. We call this mechanism the rm-level credit
multiplier. The mechanism we characterize arises from the interplay between asset tangibility,
renegotiable bank debt, costly equity nancing, and investment and diers from the economy-wide
credit multiplier discussed in the macroeconomics literature. As we discuss below, the rm-level
credit multiplier yields a number of new testable predictions, such as the increased sensitivity of
investment to Tobin's Q for nancially constrained rms.
The dynamic model we use is uniquely suitable for the purpose of our analysis. Among other
features, it allows us to compute security values, characterize dynamic aspects of the credit multi-
plier, and gauge the impact of nancing{investment interactions upon a number of variables that
are of wide interest for empirical research (e.g., Q and debt issuance). In addition to closed-form
solutions for constrained and unconstrained rm values and nancing{investment strategies, the
model enables us to simulate articial panel data sets and conduct cross-sectional tests similar to
those later performed in our empirical tests (based on COMPUSTAT data).
Our model's central results guide us in performing novel empirical tests on the extensively stud-
ied relation between corporate investment and Q. The model shows, for example, that the impact
of the credit multiplier on investment is only signicant for rms that face nancing frictions and
that it increases with the degree of tangibility of those rms' assets. Empirically, both Q and
asset tangibility are expected to aect investment behavior, but the model's credit multiplier eect
implies that the interaction of these two variables will have a strong positive impact on investment
in a cross-section of nancially constrained rms. Put dierently, our theory predicts that positive
innovations to investment prospects prompt stronger responses in observed capital spending when
the rm solves a constrained optimization problem and its assets are more tangible.
We test our theory using a large sample of manufacturers over the 1971{2005 period. As is stan-
dard in the corporate investment literature, we identify the predictions of our model based on com-
parisons between rms that are likely to be more nancially constrained (\constrained rms") and
rms that are likely to be less constrained (\unconstrained rms"). We employ multiple schemes to
partition the data into constrained and unconstrained subsamples. These are based on rm char-
acteristics, such as payout policy, rm size, and debt ratings (bond and commercial paper ratings).
For each constraint partition scheme, we nd that asset tangibility promotes investment through
a credit multiplier eect for constrained rms, but not for unconstrained rms. As discussed above,
because of the role of asset tangibility in simultaneously boosting nancing and investment, our
theory implies that the credit multiplier will be nely identied in the cross-section by interacting
asset tangibility with Q. Consistent with this prediction, our tests show that estimates for this
interaction term reliably explain investment across nancially constrained rms. Moreover, we nd
that this interaction eect is even more pronounced in a more rened set of tests in which we split
constrained rms into subsamples with low and high incremental (or \spare") debt capacity. In par-
ticular, in line with our theory, we nd that constrained rms with largely untapped debt capacity
2display the strongest relation between investment and asset tangibility interacted with Q. Notably,
none of the eects just described are found in the cross-section of nancially unconstrained rms.
We perform an exhaustive round of checks to verify that our results also obtain under alter-
native test specications and methods. We show, for example, that our results do not rely on a
priori assignments of rms into nancing constraint categories, such as those based on observables
like rm size and debt ratings. In particular, we also estimate switching regressions in which the
probability that rms face constrained access to credit is jointly estimated with the structural in-
vestment equations | i.e., constraint assignments are endogenous to investment. Our results also
obtain when we use maximum likelihood estimations (switching regressions), GMM estimations, and
error-consistent estimations in which Q is replaced with Cummins et al.'s (2006) RealQ. Under each
of these alternative tests, the impact of asset tangibility on constrained rms' nancing{investment
interactions remains economically and statistically signicant.
To further characterize our proposed mechanism, we also look at the eect of asset tangibility
on nancing decisions. Surprisingly, there is only limited empirical work on the link between tan-
gibility and capital structure. Existing studies largely document a positive correlation between the
ratio of xed-to-total assets and nancial leverage.2 The evidence in the literature is consistent
with the idea that asset tangibility matters for raising external nancing. However, existing papers
do not investigate the role of asset tangibility in underlying a channel between nancial contracting
and real-side investment. Our tests show that asset tangibility magnies the eect of shocks to
investment opportunities onto debt issuance when rms are nancially constrained, but not when
they are unconstrained. In other words, the tangibility-led amplication eect that is found for
investment spending is also observed for debt policies when rms face nancing frictions. The
evidence we report for leverage decisions agrees with the predictions of our credit multiplier theory.
The papers closest to ours are Almeida and Campello (2007) and Hennessy et al. (2007).
Almeida and Campello nd that cash ow has a larger impact on investment when assets are
more tangible. In contrast to their empirical paper, we develop a model of the role played by asset
tangibility in underlying an endogenous link between nancing and investment in the presence of
nancing imperfections. Moreover, our analysis shows how debt policies (e.g., debt issuance) are
aected by asset tangibility, while their study provides no characterization of rm nancial policies.
Hennessy et al. analyze Q theory with nancing frictions for rms using risk-free debt and costly ex-
ternal equity. In contrast, our model encompasses mixtures of risky debt and costly external equity.
Their study is silent on the credit multiplier and its implications, which is the focus of our analysis.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 studies a dynamic model of nancing
and investment. Section 3 discusses data and empirical methodology. Section 4 tests our theory's
main predictions. Section 5 concludes.
2One exception is a recent paper by Campello and Giambona (2011), who show that the redeployability of
tangible assets has a causal impact on corporate leverage.
32 Theory
2.1 Setup
Time is continuous and the horizon is innite. Consider a rm that has a growth option but no
assets-in-place and no outstanding debt.3 At any point in time t  0, the rm may exercise its
option by paying a xed cost K in exchange for receiving uncertain cash ows. This exercise cost
of the growth option can be nanced by debt, equity, or a mixture of debt and equity. Potential
cash ows from option exercise are subject to productivity shocks and evolve over time according
to a geometric Brownian motion, Xt, with drift , volatility , and initial value X0 > 0. The rm
is risk-neutral and discounts at the risk-free rate r > .
We model the pledgeability of the rm's assets (i.e., the value of the exercised growth option
V ) by assuming that the transfer of the rm's physical assets in bankruptcy entails costs that are
proportional to those assets. If the rm's assets are seized by its creditors, only a fraction,  V < V ,
of the rm's physical capital is recovered.  is a function of the nature of the rm's assets (e.g.,
assets such as land and machinery are easier to verify and foreclose than patents and trademarks),
as well as industry characteristics, such as capital utilization rates and used capital redeployability.
The rm can nance the exercise cost with a mix of bank debt, which is renegotiable, and exter-
nal equity. Bank debt promises a contractual payment of b unless the rm is liquidated (i.e., claims
are settled and the proportion of tangible rm value, , is transferred to the bank). As we allow for
renegotiation of the debt contract, strategic default optimally occurs when cash ows decline su-
ciently.4 At that point, equityholders keep control of the rm and make take-it or leave-it oers to
the bank, which results in strategic instead of contractual debt payments until cash ows rise again.
Finally, external equity funding of the capital expenditure, K, is costly if the rm faces nancial
frictions; i.e., the rm cannot nd fairly-priced funding for its protable investment opportunity.5
In particular, each equity-nanced $1 of the capital expenditure leads to an exercise cost of $(1+)
for the constrained rm, where  > 0 represents the linear component of equity issuance costs, while
each equity-nanced $1 for the unconstrained rm leads to an exercise cost equal to $1.6
3This allows us to abstract from the debt overhang problem analyzed in an extensive literature (see, e.g., Chen
and Manso (2010), Hackbarth and Mauer (2011), and the references therein).
4See, for example, Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997), Fan and Sundaresan (2000), and Hackbarth et al. (2007),
where liquidation is also inecient but, in equilibrium, bilateral bargaining eliminates liquidation.
5See Bernanke et al. (2000) for models on how nancing frictions inuence macroeconomic dynamics.
6For simplicity and tractability, oatation costs are normalized to zero for the unconstrained rm in that we can
regard nancing frictions as a relative statement about issuance costs of constrained and unconstrained rms. The
numerical simulations we carry out below do not require algebraic tractability. So we will add quadratic issuance
costs for constrained rms as suggested by Atinkilic and Hansen (2000) as well as much smaller, linear oatation
costs for unconstrained rms to reinforce the robustness of our model's main prediction.
42.2 Solution
We work recursively by rst solving for rm value after investment, V . We then determine bank
debt value after investment, B. A prerequisite for this bank debt valuation is the characterization
of the optimal strategic debt service when the rm has the ability to make take-it or leave-it oers
to the bank. We value the constrained rm and the unconstrained rm at time zero, which allows
us to derive their value-maximizing investment strategies.
The rm's value after investment is given by:
V (X) = U X ; (1)
where X denotes the current cash ow and U  1=(r ) denotes the growth-adjusted, risk-neutral
discount factor. Consequently, the value of the rm in case of bankruptcy (i.e., liquidation) equals:
L(X) =  V (X) : (2)
In case of renegotiation, equityholders make take-it or leave-it oers to the bank. Since the
bank can reject an oer, the bank's payo in case of bankruptcy, L, represents its outside option
in the bargaining game with the rm. Outside of renegotiation, the bank can claim at the most








given that it would reject any debt service oer yielding a lower payo than R.
On the one hand, strategic debt payments, s, must be sucient to induce acceptance by the
bank; i.e., B(X)  R(X). On the other hand, there must exist an incentive for the rm to make
strategic rather than contractual debt payments; i.e., s < b. The latter observation implies an
interval, [X;1), such that no renegotiation occurs above an endogenously determined renegotia-
tion threshold, X. Since equity's dividends are decreasing in the strategic debt service, the former
observation implies that B(X) = R(X) over the interval (0;X) where renegotiation occurs.7
In the renegotiation region, the bank's claim B pays s and oers capital gains E[dB(X)] over
each time interval dt. The required rate of return for holding this claim is the risk-free rate r.
Therefore, the Bellman equation for all X 2 (0;X) is:
rB(X)dt = E[dB(X)] + sdt ; (4)
where E[] is the expectation operator. Applying Ito's lemma to the right-hand side of this equation,
it follows that the bank debt value satises for all X 2 (0;X) the ordinary dierential equation:
rB = X BX + 1
2 2X2 BXX + s ; (5)
7We conne attention to strategic debt service functions that are piecewise right-continuous in X (see, e.g.,
Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997) or Hackbarth et al. (2007) for more details).
5where subscripts denote partial derivatives. Substituting R and its derivatives for B implies that,
in the renegotiation region, strategic debt service is linear in X, taking the form: s(X) =  X.
Similar arguments imply that the bank debt value satises for all X 2 [X;1):
rB = X BX + 1
2 2X2 BXX + b : (6)
The solution of Eq. (6) is B(X) = A1X + A2X + b
r where  > 1 and  < 0 are the positive and
negative roots of the quadratic equation: Q()  1
2  (   1)2 +     r = 0. The constants A1
and A2 are determined by the value-matching conditions B (X) = L(X) and limX!1 B (X) = b
r.

















if X 2 [X;1) :
(7)
To determine the optimal renegotiations strategy, consider starting at an arbitrarily high value
of X where the payment of b is made. In choosing the renegotiation threshold, X, equityholders nd
the highest cash ow level such that an oer s(X) is accepted by the bank in the left neighborhood



















Finally, the value of equity equals, in each of the two regions, the rm's value less the value of




















if X 2 [X;1) :
(10)
We next solve the unconstrained rm's investment problem. This is not only a useful bench-
mark, but also an ingredient of the constrained rm's investment problem. Working backwards,
the value of the unconstrained rm prior to investment, Fu, equals the expected present value of
equity value at the time of investment, T u, minus the capital expenditure net of bank debt value






S(XT u)   (K   B(XT u))

: (11)
Because the rm does not produce any cash ows before investment, owners only receive capital
gains of E[dFu(X)] over each time interval dt. The required rate of return for investing in the uncon-
strained rm is the risk-free rate r. Therefore, the Bellman equation in the continuation region is:
rFu(X)dt = E[dFu(X)] : (12)
6Applying Ito's lemma to the right-hand side of Eq. (12) implies that the value of the unconstrained
rm prior to investment satises the ordinary dierential equation:




Eq. (13) has the general solution Fu(X) = A1X+A2X, which is subject to three boundary condi-
tions. First, the value of the unconstrained rm upon investing is equal to the payo from investing:
Fu( ^ Xu) = S( ^ Xu)   (K   B( ^ Xu)) ; (14)
where ^ Xu denotes the unconstrained rm's investment threshold. In the absence of frictions, Eqs.
(7) and (10) imply that the unconstrained rm's value-matching condition in Eq. (14) simplies to:
Fu( ^ Xu) = V ( ^ Xu)   K : (15)
Second, as cash ows tend to zero, the option to invest becomes worthless so that it satises:
limX!0 Fu(X) = 0. Third, to ensure that investment occurs along the optimal path, the uncon-
strained rm's optimal investment threshold, ^ Xu, is the one that maximizes the unconstrained rm'
option value to invest. Solving the unconstrained rm's problem yields the following proposition.
Proposition 1 The unconstrained rm's value-maximizing investment strategy is:






where  > 1 is the positive root of the quadratic equation: Q()  1
2  (   1)2 +     r = 0.







 (r   )

: (17)
The results in Eqs. (16) and (17) reveal that asset tangibility is irrelevant for the unconstrained rm.
Perhaps surprisingly, the unconstrained rm's solution is invariant to asset tangibility even
though it also utilizes a mixture of renegotiable bank debt and equity to nance investment. Propo-
sition 1 characterizes some basic and realistic features of nancing{investment dynamics of the un-
constrained rm. In the absence of nancing frictions, the features of the benchmark case are also
typical for models with all-equity nancing of the exercise cost (see Dixit and Pindyck (1994)). For
example, because the exercise payo increases with the growth rate of cash ows, , and decreases
with the exercise cost, K, the value-maximizing investment threshold of the unconstrained rm,
^ Xu, declines with  and rises with K. During a given time interval [0;T], the dynamic model
implies that the investment hazard (i.e., the likelihood of reaching an investment point, at which
7the option to invest is optimally exercised) rises with  and declines with K.8 Similarly, a greater
volatility for the changes in X produces more uncertainty over the value of the exercise payo and
hence an increased incentive to wait since the hysteresis term,

 1, is an increasing function of .
Similar arguments apply to the derivation for the constrained rm. That is, the value of the
constrained rm prior to investment satises the following ordinary dierential equation:




which is again solved subject to suitable boundary conditions. First, the value of the constrained
rm upon investing equals the payo from investing net of equity issuance costs if applicable:
Fc( ^ Xc) = S( ^ Xc)   (K   B( ^ Xc))   (K   B( ^ Xc))1K>B( ^ Xc) ; (19)
where ^ Xc denotes the constrained rm's investment threshold and 1! represents the indicator
function of the event !. Since bank debt is renegotiable and, in equilibrium, bilateral bargaining
eliminates liquidation, the rm utilizes the largest available value of B( ^ Xu) in Eq. (19) to econ-
omize on external equity issuance costs. Notice that, even though @B(X)=@b  0, there exists a
bank debt capacity for an arbitrary cash ow level, X, in the following sense:
9 bmax s.t. X(bmax) = X ) B(X) = B(X) = R(X) : (20)
Intuitively, there is a critical bank coupon capacity, bmax(X), beyond which raising promised pay-









 X : (21)
Importantly, this bank debt capacity is an increasing function of asset tangibility, which plays
an important role for the constrained rm. Substituting Eq. (21) into Eq. (7) and evaluating at
X = ^ Xu yields an endogenous \quantity constraint" in the spirit of Hart and Moore (1994) in that
B( ^ Xc) j
b = bmax( ^ Xc)
= R( ^ Xc) for optimal bank debt nancing at the endogenously selected time
of investment. Second, as cash ows tend to zero, the option to invest becomes worthless so that
it satises: limX!0 Fc(X) = 0. Third, to ensure that investment occurs along the optimal path,
the constrained rm's optimal investment threshold, ^ Xc, is the one that maximizes the constrained
rm' option value to invest. Solving the constrained rm's problem yields the following proposition.








































where () is the standard normal distribution. This probability declines with the investment threshold ^ X
u.
8Proposition 2 The constrained rm's value-maximizing investment strategy is:
^ Xc =
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
^ Xu if  2 [;1) ;





if  2 [;) ;








if  2 [0;) ;
(22)














= 0 ; (23)














= 0 : (24)
For all X  ^ Xc, the constrained rm's value is given by:
Fc(X) =
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
















 (r   )

if  2 [0;) ;
(25)
where Fu is given in Eq. (17). The results in Eqs. (22) and (25) reveal that asset tangibility is
relevant for the constrained rm.
Proof. The general solution to Eq. (18) along with the two value-matching conditions for










which has three distinct investment policies, since the indicator function can be zero in two dierent
regions (i.e., with or without optimally timed exercise) or one in a third region. To see this, sup-
pose that there exists a critical level , above which equity issuance costs are not incurred, and the
indicator function is equal to zero. Then Eq. (26) simplies to Eq. (17) for  2 [;1) and hence the
constrained rm's investment threshold coincides with the unconstrained rm's investment thresh-
old, ^ Xu, in Eq. (16). Next, suppose that there also is a critical level , below which equity issuance










The smooth-pasting condition Fc
X( ^ Xc) = 0 yields the constrained rm's investment threshold, ^ Xc,
in Eq. (22) if  2 [0;).
9Since the additional term in ^ Xc compared to ^ Xu,
1 + 
1 + 
, is always greater than one, we have
^ Xu < ^ Xc at  = . Accordingly, we also have Fc(X) < Fu(X) at  = . Thus, the constrained
rm's value function, which is based on incurring equity issuance costs and timing the option
optimally, and the unconstrained rm's value function, imply a jump at the point where tangibility
is suciently high such that a switch from the constrained to the unconstrained investment policy
is optimal. Note that, at this switch point , we have that B( ^ Xu)  K and hence in the left
neighborhood of  we also have that B( ^ Xu + )  K since B0(X) > 0 and hence there is an
intermediate region of not timing exercise optimally to avoid equity issuance costs. Then the
constrained rm optimally invests at the bank-funding threshold, which solves B( ^ Xc)   K = 0,
because this dominates the expected present value from investing at the optimally timed thresholds
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Letting the rst inequality hold with equality yields Eq. (24) and the letting the second inequality
hold with equality yields Eq. (23). Depending on asset tangibility which implies feasibility, the
constrained rm can pick from three increasingly valuable investment policies: optimally timed
investment without equity issuance costs, bank-funded investment without equity issuance costs
and without optimal timing, and optimally timed investment with equity issuance costs.
Proposition 2 describes the nancing{investment dynamics of the constrained rm, which em-
ploys | like the unconstrained rm | a mixture of debt and equity to nance the growth option.
The proposition highlights several interesting features of corporate nancing and investment in the
presence of nancing imperfections. First, a comparison between Propositions 1 and 2 indicates
that asset tangibility is irrelevant for the solution of the unconstrained rm's optimization prob-
lem. However, Proposition 2 reveals that the interaction between asset tangibility and contracting
frictions plays a critical role in the solution of the constrained rm's optimization problem.
Second, the rst case in Eq. (22) formalizes the intuition that asset tangibility can relax nanc-
ing constraints in the \high" tangibility region. For a suciently high level of asset tangibility given
by the solution to Eq. (23), which equates the expected present value from the bank-funding rule
that avoids equity issuance costs at the expense of optimal timing with the one from investing with-
out equity issuance costs and with optimal timing, the constrained rm's problem coincides with
the unconstrained rm's problem and hence contracting frictions are irrelevant in this limiting case.
Intuitively, the constrained rm's bank debt coupon capacity in Eq. (21) rises with asset tangibility
and hence bank debt can assume a suciently high value relative to the exercise cost such that
10B( ^ Xc)  K for an optimally timed exercise threshold. As a result of this larger debt capacity, the
constrained rm can avoid issuing costly external equity when optimally timing option exercise and
behaves like the unconstrained rm. In other words, if and only if asset tangibility is suciently
high, then the constrained rm still implements the unconstrained rm's investment policy.
Third, Proposition 2 reveals the existence of another critical level of asset tangibility, one that
solves Eq. (24). The reason for this \intermediate" region described by Eqs. (22) and (25) is
that in the interval [;) the expected present value from investing at the non-optimally timed
bank-funding threshold, which solves B( ^ Xc)   K = 0, dominates the expected present value from
investing at the optimally timed threshold with equity issuance costs.9 At the critical level  (or
) the optimally timed value with (or without) costly external equity nancing equals the non-
optimally timed value from investing at the bank-funding threshold. Importantly, the constrained
rm's value-maximizing investment threshold declines with  in the interval [;). In other words,
the constrained rm's investment problem is relaxed by asset tangibility in this region.
Finally, according to the last case in Eq. (22), the constrained rm with suciently low levels of
asset tangibility can only exercise its option optimally by issuing a mixture of bank debt and costly
external equity. For this \low tangibility" region where the rm incurs equity issuance costs, com-
parison of Eq. (22) to Eq. (16) implies that the ratio   ^ Xc= ^ Xu = (1+)=(1+) is strictly greater
than one for non-zero equity issuance costs, increasing with equity issuance costs, and decreasing
with asset tangibility. This ratio shows how tangibility also relaxes the rm's nancial constraint in
the \low tangibility" region where the rm incurs equity issuance costs: @=@ =  (1+)=(1+
)2 < 0: Moreover, the rm's strategic behavior in the renegotiation region, (0;X), leads to an
endogenous \quantity constraint" that is based on its asset tangibility, , which, in turn, interacts
with issuance costs, . Importantly for our analysis, notice that the wedge between constrained and
unconstrained investment thresholds rises with nancing frictions: @=@ = (1 )=(1+)2 > 0:
Taken together, the cross-partial derivative of this wedge in the \low tangibility" region is:
@2=@ @ =  (1 + (2   ))=(1 + )3 < 0 ; (28)
which means that the positive role of asset tangibility for investment is stronger for more constrained
rms (i.e., rms with larger nancing constraints benet relatively more from asset tangibility).
In all, Proposition 2 formally characterizes how the interplay of asset tangibility, renegotiable
bank debt, costly external equity, and investment gives rise to the rm-level credit multiplier.
9Intuitively, constrained rms with intermediate tangibility are willing to delay investment a bit beyond the
unconstrained threshold in order to avoid equity otation costs. These rms invest at just the bank-funding point
where the bank would be willing to fund the entire investment. For constrained rms with suciently low tangibility,
the opportunity cost (in terms of forgone dividends) of delaying investment until the bank is willing to fund the entire
capital expenditure is simply too high and hence these rms act as if equity will be the marginal source of nancing.
112.3 Economic Characterization
To see the credit multiplier at work, consider a positive innovation to investment opportunities. In
particular, consider a shock to product demand (say, higher cash ows X) that implies a higher in-
vestment option value. The rm's demand for investment increases with higher potential cash ows
from investment. As the rm invests, its capital base increases. If the rm's assets are intangible,
an increase in the rm's asset base does not boost recovery values, which are lenders' \enforceable"
outside option in case of contract renegotiations. Investment in tangible assets, in contrast, pro-
vides higher recovery values and hence a better protection from ex post hold-up problems (strategic
default). Dierently put, higher collateral values improve creditors' position in renegotiations, en-
larging ex ante debt capacity. Access to more (or cheaper) bank credit, in turn, allows for further
investment avoiding the need to tap into costly external equity. An important point brought up by
the model is that this nancing{investment mechanism dynamically propagates itself across time
(albeit at a diminishing rate, dictated by the level of asset tangibility).
More generally, the rm-level credit multiplier eect says that greater credit capacity triggers
faster investment responses to positive innovations to investment opportunities. The implication is
that following a series of positive shocks to investment opportunities, constrained rms with more
tangible assets will invest, on average, more often; and in a present value sense, they will invest
larger amounts than otherwise identical rms with less tangible assets.
We further characterize the rm-level credit multiplier in Figure 1 below. The gure shows
the eect of asset tangibility, , on value-maximizing investment, where the dashed lines chart
the unconstrained rm's exercise threshold, ^ Xu, and the solid lines chart the constrained rm's
exercise thresholds, ^ Xc. It is assumed that the initial cash ow is X = $1, the risk-free interest
rate is r = 6%, the growth rate of potential cash ows is  = 0:5%, the volatility of potential cash
ows is  = 30%, and the investment cost is K = $10. The constrained rm in the left panel faces
linear equity issuance costs of 12% whereas the more constrained rm in the right panel faces linear
equity issuance costs of 12% and quadratic equity issuance costs of 1%.
Notice that the slope of the more constrained rm's exercise threshold is steeper, suggesting
that the eect of asset tangibility on nancing{investment dynamics is stronger for the rm that
faces larger nancing frictions. Simply put, as emphasized in the model solution, asset tangibility
matters relatively more for more constrained rms. Notice also that in the right panel, where the
unconstrained rm faces mild nancing frictions, the unconstrained investment threshold, ^ Xu, is
not completely independent of asset tangibility. Yet the unconstrained rm's response to changes
in asset tangibility is much less pronounced than that of the constrained rm.
The central implication of the rm-level credit multiplier described in our model is that asset
tangibility amplies the impact of productivity shocks by reducing frictions faced by nancially
constrained rm. This is akin to a propagation mechanism that translates positive shocks to un-
observed investment opportunities more directly into observed nancing and investment when the


















Figure 1. Asset Tangibility, Financing Constraints, and Investment
The gure shows the eect of asset tangibility, , on constrained and unconstrained investment. The dashed lines chart
the unconstrained rm's exercise threshold, ^ X
u, and the solid lines plot the constrained rm's exercise thresholds,
^ X
c. It is assumed that the initial cash ow is X = $1, the risk-free interest rate is r = 6%, the growth rate of potential
cash ows is  = 0:5%, the volatility of potential cash ows is  = 30%, and the investment cost is K = $10. In
the left panel, the unconstrained rm faces no equity issuance costs, while the constrained rm faces linear equity
issuance costs of 12%. In the right panel, the unconstrained rm faces moderate equity issuance costs of 2%, whereas
the constrained rm faces linear equity issuance costs of 12% and quadratic equity issuance costs of 1%.
rm faces nancing frictions. These novel nancing{investment interactions are dynamic in nature
and create an endogenous relationship between nancing and investment decisions under nancing
imperfections. Our analysis is in sharp contrast to those in which investment is exogenous to the
rm's nancial status and nancing decisions.
2.4 Simulation
In addition to obtaining closed-form solutions for the constrained and the unconstrained rm values
and investment strategies, our model also allows us to simulate nancing{investment interactions,
hence establish a closer connection between theory and empirics. Notably, we can verify our model's
main empirical implication by estimating the base regression specication and the interactive (credit
multiplier) specication using model-implied, simulated panel data sets.
To verify that our theoretical analysis implies a strong interaction eect between asset tangibility
and Q in investment regressions (as later identied by our empirical analysis), we use simulation to
generate articial data from the model. These simulations take the solutions to the optimization
problems in Propositions 1 and 2 as given and do not involve any additional optimizations. To
begin, each rm i is characterized by the vector of model parameters (Tangiblity;K;r;X;;),
which may be rm- or industry-specic. Since our focus is on the positive role of asset tangibility for
13constrained rms, we only need rm-level heterogeneity along this dimension. That is, Tangibility
is specied by the set  2 f0:025;0:05;:::;0:725;0:75g scaled by K, which provides 30 dierent
\tangibility" cases when using a step size of 0.025. The investment expenditure is normalized to
K = $10. The risk-free rate is assumed to equal r = 6%. The initial cash ow level is X0 = $1,
the growth rate of cash ows is  = 0:5%, and the volatility of cash ows is  = 30%. Finally, the
rm-specic cash ow process is discretized using the following approximation for t  t:




where t is is one quarter and t is a standard normal random variable.
To present a realistic and rich treatment of nancial constraints, we consider two alternative
cases. In the rst case, which corresponds to the modeling assumptions for Propositions 1 and 2,
the unconstrained rm faces no equity issuance costs (i.e.,  = 0%), while in the second case the
unconstrained rm faces also a mild level of oatation costs (i.e.,  = 2%). Consistent with the
theoretical analysis, the constrained rm faces only a linear issuance costs of  = 12% in the rst
case. In the second case, we enrich the model simulations by letting the constrained rm face an
additional quadratic oatation cost of 1%.
We want to translate the simulated Xt-paths of each rm into a time series of Q values (recall,
that Q is the ratio of the rm's market value divided by its investment cost). Proposition 1 implies
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which is, as suggested by economic intuition, increasing in Xt since  > 1 (i.e., @Qu =@Xt > 0),
but invariant to asset tangibility (i.e., @Qu =@ = 0). Similarly, the theory provides analytical
insights into the eect of asset tangibility on Q for constrained rms. Using the last expression
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which is also increasing in Xt (i.e., @Qc =@Xt > 0).10 In addition, growth options of constrained
rms with more tangible assets are, all else equal, more valuable and hence @Qc =@ > 0. Taken
together, the rm-level credit multiplier can be re-expressed for Q: @2Qc =@ @Xt > 0. Accord-
ingly, the interaction term of Q and , Q, captures the increasingly high investment propensity
associated with both high cash ow levels and high tangibility levels. Note that Q alone can be high
because of a rising Xt-path even when  is low, which would not imply, on average, a higher invest-
ment hazard of constrained rms. Therefore, the interaction term should measure the additional,
10For brevity, the value of Q
c(Xt) in the \intermediate tangibility" region is suppressed and the corresponding
value in the \high tangibility" region is given in Eq. (30). Naturally, all three regions are used in the simulation.
14incremental eect on investment of constrained rms when both Xt and  are high. According to
our theory, the coecient estimate of Q should, however, be insignicant for unconstrained rms.
To minimize the inuence of any particular simulation experiment, we generate in total 200
panel data sets, which are populated by 600 rms (i.e., 20 rms for each of the 30 \tangibility"
cases). In each panel, we follow these rms for 70 years at a quarterly frequency. As we drop the rst
35 years from each panel to minimize the inuence of the initial conditions and we transform the
quarterly data into annual (year-end) data, we end up with 21,000 rm-year observations per panel.
Panel A of Table 1 reports average coecient estimates of regression results for the 200 simulated
data sets with 600 rms over 35 years using the base regression specication, in which investment
is modeled as a linear function of only Q and Tangibility (omitting at rst the Q-interactive term
from Eq. (33)). Panel B tabulates estimation results for the credit multiplier regression specication
in Eq. (33). That is, the base investment model includes Q and Tangbility as rm characteristics
without the Q-interactive term, while the credit multiplier (interactive) investment model contains
Q, Tangibility, and Q  Tangibility as independent variables. As dependent variable, we use an
investment hazard, dened as the number of investment points per rm for a given time period
scaled by K. In particular, the investment intensity Investment = I=K is dened as the cumula-
tive counter, I 2 f0;1;2;:::g, of a rm starting from X and reaching an investment point, ^ X, the
rst time from below divided by the book value of assets, K. At the time of reaching an investment
point, the rm is replaced by a replica of itself starting again at the initial cash ow level with an
identical but unexercised option.
To begin, for each of the two cases of nancial constraints considered in Panel A of Table 1,
we observe that Investment responds very signicantly to Q across all estimations and partitions.
As expected from the real options model, Q is particularly strong across nancially constrained
rms. Interestingly, Investment only responds reliably to Tangiblity for constrained rms in the
model-implied, simulated panel data sets.
Insert Table 1 About Here
As discussed above, a direct way to gauge the multiplier eect in the actual and simulated data
is to interact Q with Tangibility. Panel B tests the main prediction of our model by estimating
Eq. (33) across subsamples of constrained and unconstrained rms in the articial data. Consistent
with the economic intuition derived from the model, we can generally reject with high statistical
condence (lower than 1% test-level) the hypothesis that the coecients on the interaction term
are similar across subsamples of constrained and unconstrained model rms. Moreover, the table
reinforces the existence of an important interactive (multiplier) eect of Q and Tangibility across
nancially constrained rms. Simply put, the tangibility-led rm-level credit multiplier disappears
in the absence of model-induced nancing constraints. However, it plays an increasingly important
role in explaining investment intensities as model-induced nancing constraints increase. As will be
15made clearer in Section 4, Table 1 implies a notable success in linking the model-implied regression
results for articial data to the regression results we obtain using COMPUSTAT data.
2.5 Model Extensions
Our model delivers a parsimonious, testable characterization of the rm-level credit multiplier. The
next section builds on the basic implications of our theory to check empirically whether data on
rm nancing and investment decisions seem to engender the rm-level credit multiplier eect. Be-
fore conducting those tests, however, we describe a number of interesting extensions of our model.
While we think these extensions are beyond the scope of the current paper, we briey discuss some
of their implications.
A natural matter for studying the interface between macroeconomics and corporate nance is
whether nancing constraints, in general, and, in particular, equity issuance costs are time-varying,
possibly moving with aggregate conditions. We chose to focus on rm-specic nancing constraints,
which are likely time-invariant, but it is natural to speculate that those constraints might bind more
with monetary policy tightenings or aggregate demand contractions. As it turns out, adding this
extra state variable would not materially change the key mechanism described by our analysis. On
the other hand, the dynamics of investment and nancing interactions might change depending
on how one models business cycles. In line with our theory, asset tangibility should matter even
more during economy-wide contractions; however, its net impact on observed investment spending
will depend on how investment demand might behave across the business cycle. A straightforward
way to assess the net eect of macroeconomic contractions on our empirical results is to contrast
the sensitivity of investment spending to asset tangibility across booms and recessions, and across
monetary easings and tightenings.
Another interesting extension is to allow asset tangibility, , to vary with time, responding pos-
itively to favorable innovations to industry prices and demand conditions. While endogenizing 
would add complexity to our framework, our conclusions would not be materially aected. Indeed,
doing so would generally strengthen our model's results. To see this, note that in a setting where a
rm's assets are valued as a function of industry demand, one has that positive shocks to product
prices will make investment both more desirable (occurring earlier in our framework) and easier
to nance (due to higher bank debt capacity). As for a test of this idea, we note that while not
explicitly considered in our empirical analysis, one of our measures of asset tangibility (based on
the Bureau of Census data) varies over time according to industry conditions of demand for capital.
Finally, one would nd it interesting to allow the unconstrained rm to raise additional debt
capital from a continuum of lenders in public debt markets, with endogenous default and associated
endogenous deadweight losses capitalized into debt prices. In addition to the constrained rm's
endogenous \quantity constraint" based on asset tangibility, this extension would produce an en-
dogenous \pricing constraint" for the unconstrained rm, which is also based on asset tangibility.
16Since this additional type of debt introduces the risk of inecient liquidation, it will not be optimal
to use it within the connes of our theory's setup unless we add other frictions, such as corporate
taxes. Under this scenario, investment would have an additional (capital structure) advantage of
gaining access to net tax benets of public debt, which rises with asset tangibility.11 Notably, an
optimal capital structure theory with multiple classes of debt is beyond the scope of this paper,
which focuses on the characterization of the rm-level credit multiplier in its most parsimonious
and simplest form. The basic setup we use does not need multiple classes of debt for the multi-
plier eect to emerge; all that is strictly necessary for the multiplier follows from asset tangibility,
renegotiable bank debt, costly external equity, and investment. Along the lines of this argument,
in Section 4.2 below we look empirically at whether constrained rms choose to issue debt in ways
that mimic the impact of the rm-level credit multiplier eect on investment spending.
3 Data and Empirical Test Design
3.1 Data Description
Our sample selection approach follows that of Almeida et al. (2004) and Almeida and Campello
(2007). We consider the universe of U.S. manufacturing rms (SICs 2000{3999) over the 1971{2005
period with data available from COMPUSTAT on total assets, market capitalization, capital expen-
ditures, and plant property and equipment (capital stock). We eliminate rm-years for which the
value of capital stock is less than $1 million, those displaying real asset or sales growth exceeding
100%, and those with negative Q or with Q in excess of 10 (we dene Q shortly). The rst selection
rule eliminates very small rms from the sample, for which linear investment models are likely inad-
equate (see Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995)). The second data cut-o eliminates those rm-years
registering large jumps in their business fundamentals (size and sales); these are typically indicative
of mergers, reorganizations, and other major corporate events. The third cut-o is introduced as a
rst, crude attempt to minimize the impact of problems in the measurement of investment opportu-
nities, and to improve the tness of our investment demand model. Among many others, Abel and
Eberly (2002) and Cummins et al. (2006) use similar cut-os and discuss the poor empirical t of
linear investment equations at high levels of Q. We deate all series to 1971 dollars using the CPI.
Our basic sample consists of an unbalanced panel with 65,508 rm-year observations with 6,316
unique rms. Table 2 describes the computation and reports summary statistics for the variables
used in our main tests. Since our sampling and variable construction methods follow that of the
literature, it is not surprising that the numbers we report in Table 2 resemble those found in re-
lated studies (e.g., Almeida and Campello (2007)). In the interest of brevity, we omit a detailed
11If the unconstrained rm can, in addition to external equity and renegotiable bank debt, issue non-renegotiable
bond market debt as, e.g., in Proposition 1 in Hackbarth et al. (2007), then this would also lead to a weak dependence
of the unconstrained rm's investment threshold on asset tangibility in this more general setting.
17discussion of the sample summary statistics.
Insert Table 2 About Here
3.2 Empirical Specication
The central result of our theory is that of a feedback eect between investment and nancing in the
presence of credit constraints: tangible assets ease nancing, which amplies the response of rm
investment spending to shifts in rm investment opportunities. We develop two empirical models
to test our credit multiplier idea, one concerns investment, the other concerns nancing decisions.
First, we specify a multiplicative-type model relating investment spending (I) to investment
opportunities (Q) and asset tangibility (). In particular, we consider:
it = 1Qt 1 + 2t 1 + 3 (Qt 1  t 1); (32)
where it = It=Kt 1 denotes capital-normalized investment over time t. Our credit multiplier theory
predicts that the interaction term Q has a positive coecient in an investment equation like Eq.
(32) when the rm faces nancing constraints; in short, the rm invests relatively more in response
to positive investment opportunities when its assets allow for more credit capacity. No such eects
should be observed in a cross-section of nancially unconstrained rms.
To operationalize our test, we experiment with a parsimonious model of investment demand.
We do so by augmenting the standard Q-theory investment equation with a proxy for asset tan-
gibility and an interaction term that allows the role of Q to vary with asset tangibility. Dene
Investment as the ratio of capital expenditures (COMPUSTAT item #128) to beginning-of-period
capital stock (lagged item #8). Q is our basic proxy for investment opportunities, computed as
the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets, or (item #6 + (item #24  item
#25)   item #60   item #74) / (item #6). We dene Tangibility shortly (see Section 3.3). Our
rst empirical model can be written as follows:
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where Firm and Year capture rm- and year-specic eects, respectively. All of our estimations
correct the regression error structure for within-rm correlation (rm clustering) and heteroskedas-
ticity using White-Huber's error-consistent estimator. Reported R2s account for xed eects.
It is worth noting that a large literature includes a rm's cash ow in investment regressions
such as Eq. (33). Our model does not generate explicit predictions for rm cash ows, but in the
robustness checks that follow we also include cash ows in our model specications. This allows for
comparisons with previous studies and serves the purpose of checking whether our ndings could
be explained by income shocks (see Section 4.1.3).
18Secondly, we study a model of external nancing. Dene DebtIssuance as the change in the
ratio of short- and long-term debt (item #9 + item #34) to lagged book value of assets (item #6).
We regress this measure of debt taking on Q, Tangibility, and an interaction term that allows the
role of Q to vary with Tangibility. Our second empirical model can be expressed as:
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Following the standard literature, we allow the coecient vector  in Eqs. (33) and (34) to
vary with the degree to which the rm faces nancing constraints by way of tting our models sepa-
rately across samples of constrained and unconstrained rms. In contrast to much of the literature,
we also estimate  using a maximum likelihood methodology in which constraint assignments are
determined jointly with the investment (or debt taking) process (see Section 3.4).
According to our theory, the extent to which investment opportunities matters for constrained
investment (alternatively, debt taking) should be an increasing function of asset tangibility. While
Eq. (33) (Eq. (34)) is a direct linear measure of the inuence of tangibility on investment (debt)
sensitivities, note that its interactive form makes the interpretation of the estimated coecients less
obvious. For instance, if one wants to assess the partial eect of Q on Investment (DebtIssuance),
one has to read o the result from 1 + 3  Tangibility. Hence, in contrast to other papers in
the literature, the estimate returned for 1 alone says little about the impact of Q on investment
demand (debt taking). That coecient represents the impact of Q when Tangibility equals zero,
a point that lies outside of the empirical distribution of our measures of asset tangibility. As we
discuss below, the summary statistics of Table 2 will aid in the interpretation of the estimates
returned by our interactive model.
3.3 Proxy for Asset Tangibility
We proxy for asset tangibility (Tangibility) using a rm-level measure of expected asset liquidation
values that borrows from Berger et al. (1996). In determining whether investors rationally value
their rms' abandonment option, Berger et al. gather data on the proceeds from discontinued op-
erations reported by a sample of manufacturing rms over the 1984{1993 period. The authors nd
that a dollar of book value yields, on average, 72 cents in exit value for total receivables, 55 cents
for inventory, and 54 cents for xed assets. Following their study, we estimate liquidation values
for the rm-years in our sample via the computation:
Tangibility = 0:715  Receivables + 0:547  Inventory + 0:535  Capital;
where Receivables is COMPUSTAT item #2, Inventory is item #3, and Capital is item #8. As in
Berger et al., we add the value of cash holdings (item #1) to this measure and scale the result by
total book assets.
193.4 Financially Constrained and Financially Unconstrained Groupings
Our tests require splitting rms according to measures of nancing constraints. There are many
plausible approaches to sorting rms into nancially \constrained" and \unconstrained" categories.
Our basic approach follows the standard literature, using ex-ante nancial constraint sortings that
are based on rm observables, such as payout policy, rm size, and debt ratings. In particular, we
adopt the sorting schemes discussed in Almeida et al. (2004) and Acharya et al. (2007):
 Scheme #1: In every year over the 1971{2005 period, we rank rms based on their payout
ratio and assign to the nancially constrained (unconstrained) category those rms in the
bottom (top) three deciles of the payout distribution. We compute the payout ratio as the
ratio of total distributions (dividends plus stock repurchases) to assets. The intuition that -
nancially constrained rms have lower payout follows from the argument that their reluctance
to distribute funds is caused by a wedge between the costs of internal and external nancing.
 Scheme #2: We rank rms based on their total assets throughout the 1971{2005 period and
assign to the nancially constrained (unconstrained) category those rms in the bottom (top)
three deciles of the asset size distribution. The rankings are again performed on an annual
basis. The argument for size as a good measure of nancing constraints is that small rms
are typically young and less well known and thus more likely to face capital market frictions.
 Scheme #3: We retrieve data on rms' bond ratings and categorize those rms that never
had their public debt rated during our sample period as nancially constrained. Given that
unconstrained rms may choose not to use debt nancing (thus not receiving a debt rating),
we only assign to the constrained subsample those rm-years that both lack a rating and
report positive debt (see Faulkender and Petersen (2006)).12 Financially unconstrained rms
are those whose bonds have been rated during the sample period. The advantage of this
measure of constraints over the former two is that it gauges the market's assessment of a
rm's credit quality. The same rationale applies to the next measure.
 Scheme #4: We retrieve data on rms' commercial paper ratings and categorize as nancially
constrained those rms that never display any ratings during our sample period. Observations
from those rms are only assigned to the constrained subsample in years in which positive
debt is reported. Firms that issued rated commercial paper at some point during the sample
period are considered unconstrained.
Table 3 reports the number of rm-years under each of the nancial constraint categories used in
our analysis. According to the payout scheme, for example, there are 27,658 nancially constrained
12Firms with no bond ratings and no debt are not considered constrained, but our results are unaected by how we
treat these rms. The same approach is used for rms with no commercial paper ratings and no debt in Scheme #4.
20rm-years and 19,549 nancially unconstrained rm-years. The table also shows the extent to
which the four classication schemes are related. For example, out of the 27,658 rm-years clas-
sied as constrained according to the payout scheme, 12,857 are also constrained according to the
size scheme, while a much smaller fraction, 3,689 rm-years, are classied as unconstrained. The
remaining rm-years represent payout-constrained rms that are neither constrained nor uncon-
strained according to size. In general, there is a positive association among the four measures of
nancing constraints. For example, most small (large) rms lack (have) bond ratings. Also, most
small (large) rms make low (high) payouts. However, the table also makes it clear that these
cross-group correlations are far from perfect. This works against our tests nding consistent results
across all classication schemes.
Insert Table 3 About Here
One potential drawback of the ex-ante sorting approach described above is that it does not allow
the investment process to work as a determinant of the nancial constraint status | the constraint
categorization is exogenously given. In turn, we consider an alternative categorization approach
that endogenizes the constraint status together with other variables in a structural model. The ap-
proach, borrowed from Hovakimian and Titman (2006), uses a switching regression framework with
unknown sample separation to estimate investment regressions. One advantage of this estimator
is that we can simultaneously use all of the above sorting information (i.e., dividend policy, size,
bond ratings, and commercial paper ratings) together with asset tangibility to categorize rms. In
turn, we provide a brief summary of this methodology.
Assume that there are two dierent investment regimes, which we denote by \regime 1" and
\regime 2." While the number of investment regimes is given, the points of structural change are
not observable and are estimated together with the investment equations. The model is composed
of the following system of equations (estimated simultaneously):
I1it = Xit1 + "1it (35)
I2it = Xit2 + "2it (36)
y
it = Zit + uit: (37)
Eqs. (35) and (36) are the structural equations of the system; they are essentially two versions of
our baseline investment model in Eq. (33). Let Xit be the vector of explanatory variables, and 
be the vector of coecients that relates the variables in X to investment I1it and I2it. Dierential
investment behavior across rms in regime 1 and regime 2 is captured by dierences between 1
and 2. Eq. (37) is the selection equation that establishes the rm's likelihood of being in regime
1 or regime 2. The vector Zit contains the determinants of a rm's propensity of being in either
21regime. Observed investment is given by:
Iit = I1it if y
it < 0 (38)
Iit = I2it if y
it  0:
y
it is a latent variable that gauges the likelihood that the rm is in the rst or in the second regime.
The parameters 1, 2, and  are estimated via maximum likelihood. To estimate those pa-
rameters, we assume that the error terms "1, "2, and u are jointly normally distributed. Critically,
the estimator's covariance matrix allows for nonzero correlation between shocks to investment and
shocks to rms' characteristics | this makes the model we use an `endogenous switching regres-
sion.' As such, the extent to which investment spending diers across the two regimes and the
likelihood that rms are assigned to either regime are simultaneously determined.
Finally, to identify the system we need to determine which regime is the constrained one and
which regime is the unconstrained one. The algorithm in Eqs. (35){(38) creates two groups of
rms that dier according to their investment behavior, but it does not tell the econometrician
which rms are constrained. To achieve identication, we need to use priors about which rm
characteristics that are likely to be associated with nancing constraints. We do so using the
same characteristics employed in the ex-ante sortings (payout, size, and ratings). We also include
Tangibility, since as described by our model, asset tangibility can ameliorate nancing constraints.
4 Empirical Results
Our tests rst consider corporate investment. We subsequently examine cross-sectional patterns in
rm nancing (debt capacity and debt issuance).
4.1 Tests on Investment Spending
Our examination of corporate investment considers a standard investment equation and an inter-
active (\multiplier") model. We then perform robustness checks that help rule out alternative
explanations for our ndings.
4.1.1 The Base Investment Model
We build intuition for our study's empirical tests by way of estimating a simpler version of Eq.
(33). In this version, corporate investment is modeled as a linear function of only Q and Tangibility.
We would expect both of these variables to retain some explanatory power over the cross-sectional
variation of investment. In particular, absent empirical biases, investment spending should respond
to proxies for investment opportunities across all sets of rms (both nancially constrained and
unconstrained rms). As for asset tangibility, we would expect it to be a strong determinant of in-
vestment across nancially constrained rms, carrying less importance (if any) in the cross-section
of nancially unconstrained rms.
22Table 4 reports estimation results for the base regression model across nancially constrained
and unconstrained rm partitions. Panel A collects results based on exogenous characterizations of
constraints, while Panel B considers the endogenous regime switching approach. For each of the ten
constrained/unconstrained comparison pairs in Table 4, we observe that Investment responds very
signicantly to Q across all estimations and partitions. Interestingly, the coecient for Q is partic-
ularly strong across nancially constrained rms. This is noteworthy because much of the debate
about empirical biases in investment regressions in the last decade revolved around an attenuation
bias that appeared to aect constrained rms' Q in a pronounced fashion. Like other recent studies
(e.g., Baker et al. (2003) and Campello and Graham (2011)), we nd no indication that attenuation
bias in Q disproportionately aects nancially constrained rms' investment regressions.
Insert Table 4 About Here
Also noteworthy is the response of Investment to Tangibility. Consistent with the basic logic
of our theory, asset tangibility is systematically, positively associated with investment spending
when rms are nancially constrained. Indeed, our estimates suggest that this relation is econom-
ically strong. For example, the estimates from the rst partition reported in Table 4 (see row 1 in
Panel A) imply that a one-standard deviation increase in Tangibility leads to an increase of 6:7%
(= 0:56050:1196) in Investment, an increase that is equivalent to 25.6% (= 0:0670=0:2617) of the
average investment rate of our sample. These pronounced eects are not observed across nancially
unconstrained rms. For those rms, the coecients returned for Tangibility are signicantly lower
than those returned for constrained rms.
4.1.2 The Credit Multiplier Eect
Our model's central insight is related to the amplifying eect of asset tangibility on the response
of investment spending to investment opportunities in the presence of nancing constraints | the
credit multiplier. As previously discussed, a direct way to gauge the multiplier eect in the data is
to interact Q with Tangibility. We now perform several tests of the main prediction of our model,
estimating Eq. (33) across various subsamples.
Our main empirical ndings are reported in Table 5, which has the same layout of Table 4.
The results presented are remarkably strong: for every single comparison pair, the interaction term
of Q and Tangibility is highly signicant and positive for constrained rms, while either negative
or indistinguishable from zero for unconstrained rms. Indeed, one can generally reject with high
statistical condence (lower than 1% test-level) the hypothesis that the coecients of interest are
similar across the two constraint types. Noteworthy, the table reveals not only the existence of an
important interactive (multiplier) eect of Tangibility across nancially constrained rms, but also
that much of the unconditional impact of Q on Investment for constrained rms (as reported in
Table 4) is transmitted via Tangibility. Simply put, the direct eect of Q on Investment across
23constrained rms, though still positive, dwarfs in comparison with the eect that comes via its
interaction with Tangibility.
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To illustrate the economic importance of the estimates in Table 5, consider again the one re-
ported in the rst row of Panel A. While Q alone (i.e., uninteracted) has only a small eect on
investment, a one-standard deviation change in Q (= 0:5196), measured at the average level of
Tangibility (= 0:5583), leads to a 6:0% (= 0:0148 + 0:0456) increase in Investment (approximately
23:1% of the average sample rate of investment).
The evidence uncovered in Table 5 is remarkably consistent with the credit multiplier. They
show that, in the presence of nancing frictions, investment spending responds more strongly to
the arrival of new investment opportunities when a rm's assets provide more valuable collateral.
4.1.3 Robustness of the Multiplier Eect
This section collects a battery of tests designed to verify the robustness of our central ndings.
Among other things, we experiment with additional estimation procedures, consider the issue of
mismeasurement in Q, and include rm cash ows in our specications. To save space, we only
report results based on standard measures of nancial constraints.
GMM Estimations OLS estimations of investment models are believed to suer from a number
of empirical biases. As such, one could wonder about the robustness of our main results relative to
estimation approaches that ameliorate issues such as endogeneity and heteroskedasticity. To assess
whether our ndings are sensitive to the estimation methodology used, we re-estimate the models
of Table 5 via GMM. We do so following Cummins et al. (2006) and use up to three lags of the
variables included in Eq. (33) in our set of instruments. While those included regressors are in level
form, our instruments are in dierenced form.
We nd that these standard GMM estimations return coecients that are both economically
and statistically more signicant than those from the OLS model. Importantly, the inferences that
we obtain are similar. Once again, Tangibility signicantly strengthens the eect of Q on Invest-
ment for nancially constrained rms, but not for unconstrained rms. We omit the tabulation of
these GMM estimations to save space.
Mismeasurement in the Proxy for Investment Opportunities Prior work on investment
estimations has cited concerns with the possibility that the standard proxy for investment oppor-
tunities, Q, could suer from pronounced mismeasurement (e.g., Cummins et al. (2006)). One
problem with mismeasurement is that it introduces a downward bias in the variable aected by it.
In our application, the possibility that Q is severely mismeasured would lead the OLS estimator to
24over-reject the hypothesis that Q is dierent from zero. As we have shown in our base tests, how-
ever, Q is statistically signicant in all of the regressions in which it is not further interacted with
Tangibility. When we interact Q with Tangibility, Q still remains the main driver of investment,
only now via the interaction term.
It is not easy to determine how an attenuation bias in Q could systematically explain our nd-
ings. For instance, the impact of that bias on other estimates would depend on the covariance
between Q and Tangibility. As it turns out, we nd that such covariance is insignicant for our
measures of tangibility. Nevertheless, we note that the existing literature proposes remedies for
mismeasurement in Q that are easy to implement. Cummins et al. (2006), for example, contend
that Q is likely to capture the rm's investment opportunities with error because equity market
values (in the numerator of Q) often deviate from rm fundamentals, thereby misrepresenting the
rm's marginal product of investment. Those papers propose, instead, a proxy for Q (called RealQ)
that is derived from earnings projections made by nancial analysts. The empirical implementa-
tion of RealQ mimics exactly that of standard Q, except that one proxies for the unobserved future
marginal products of capital with an approximation for the future average products based on long-
term earnings forecasts from IBES. Studies using RealQ show that it systematically outperforms
standard Q in empirical investment regressions. A limitation of this approach, however, is that
only a relatively small subset of rms in COMPUSTAT has long-term earnings forecasts reported
in IBES. Additionally, note that IBES only consistently reports earnings forecasts starting in 1989.
These data considerations reduce the sample used in our RealQ tests.
In Table 6, we re-estimate the models of Table 5 (Panel A) replacing Q with RealQ. We again
nd strong support for our theory's main prediction: Tangibility reliably amplies the impact of Q
(i.e., RealQ) on Investment for nancially constrained rms, but not for unconstrained rms.
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Another potential concern with mismeasurement in Q is whether this could bias upward the
Q  Tangibility interaction term. Noting that the literature is silent on the eect of mismeasured
variables in interaction terms, we address this problem by performing a series of Monte Carlo exper-
iments. In Appendix B, we show that coecient estimates of an interaction term that contains one
(or even two) mismeasured variables are also biased towards zero. In other words, a measurement
problem in Q would make it harder for our tests to nd the eect of the credit multiplier via the
Q  Tangibility interaction term.
Including Cash Flows in the Benchmark Model The original Q theory of investment does
not prescribe a role for cash ows as a driver of investment. Since the work of Fazzari et al. (1988),
however, it has become common practice to include cash ows in empirical investment equations as
a way to gauge the impact of nancing constraints on investment decisions. Noteworthy, Fazzari et
25al.'s proposed interpretation of investment-cash ow sensitivities has been criticized on theoretical
grounds (e.g., Kaplan and Zingales (1997)) as well as on grounds that empirical biases may plague
estimates of that sensitivity (Gomes (2001) and Cummins et al. (2006)). In addition to these lim-
itations, we note that our theory does not have explicit predictions for the role of cash ows. As
result, we chose to omit cash ows from our benchmark regression model. Nevertheless, it might
be worth it experimenting with the inclusion of rm cash ows in our estimations. Doing so will
allow for comparisons with previous studies and also serve the purpose of checking whether our
ndings could be explained by stories based on the response of investment to income shocks.
In Table 7, we estimate models similar to those of Table 5 (Panel A), but now including lagged
CashFlow (COMPUSTAT item #18 plus item #14, scaled by lagged item #8) as an additional
control. Consistent with prior studies, our estimations suggest that constrained rms' invest-
ment is positively aected by cash ows; however, their investment-cash ow sensitivities are only
marginally statistically signicant (at the 10 to 5% test level). The salient feature of this new
round of estimations is that our inferences about the credit multiplier eect remain unchanged. In
particular, the new estimates for the QTangibility term closely resemble those of our benchmark
regressions, but with a slight loss in statistical signicance.
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Further Checks We further examine the robustness of our results by way of changing our proxy
for asset tangibility and by considering time-varying industry eects in our estimations.
Following Kessides (1990) and Worthington (1995), we also measure asset redeployability using
the ratio of used to total (used plus new) xed depreciable capital expenditures in an industry. The
idea that the degree of activity in asset resale markets aects nancial contractibility is formalized
in Shleifer and Vishny (1992). To construct this measure, starting from 1981, we hand-collect data
for used and new capital acquisitions at the four-digit SIC level from the Bureau of Census' Annual
Survey of the Manufacturers. Our results reported in Appendix A are qualitatively similar when
we proxy for asset tangibility using this alternative measure.
We nally examine whether industry dynamics may inuence our results by experimenting with
industry{time xed eects. This approach addresses, for example, potential biases associated with
developments in industry competition that aect investment and might be correlated with the main
elements of our story (Tangibility and Q). Our results (untabulated) show that the introduction of
industrytime interaction eects does not alter our inferences about the credit multiplier eect.
4.2 Tests on Debt Capacity and Debt Taking
Our theory on the multiplier eect of asset tangibility on investment is predicated on the notion
that tangibility enhances external nancing capacity; in particular, that it helps support additional
debt nancing. While the results thus far are consistent with this hypothesis, we have not examined
26the empirical relation between debt nancing and investment that underlies the credit multiplier.
We do so in this section. Specically, expanding our testing approach, we perform a number of
experiments considering the role of incremental (\spare") debt capacity and debt taking decisions.
4.2.1 Debt Capacity
Our tests suggest that asset tangibility helps constrained rms obtain more credit following pos-
itive innovations to investment opportunities. As a result, they invest more in response to those
innovations. Until now, the tests concerning this idea were performed without explicitly accounting
for rm nancing. In other words, we did not consider whether the rm's ex-ante indebtness would
inuence the extent to which rms take advantage of the enhanced debt capacity provided by in-
vestment in tangible assets. For instance, if a rm is already highly indebted prior to the positive
shock to investment, then it should be less able to invest as a function of asset tangibility; that is,
the credit multiplier would be weaker or even fail. In contrast, the credit multiplier is likely to be
more pronounced when innovations aect rms with more spare debt capacity.
It is dicult to gauge a rm's ex-ante debt capacity. However, our theory provides for a viable,
albeit potentially incomplete, characterization of incremental debt capacity. Recall, we argue that
the ability to obtain credit is a increasing function of a rm's asset tangibility. Accordingly, the
correlation between the rm's leverage and the degree of its asset tangibility could provide infor-
mation about the rm's spare debt capacity: if a rm carries less (more) leverage on its balance
sheet than other rms with similar asset tangibility, then that rm is likely to have higher (lower)
incremental debt capacity.13
This insight helps us construct an empirical proxy for spare debt capacity. That proxy is based
on the component of a rm's long-term debt that is not explained by the rm's asset tangibility.
This component can be directly gauged from the residuals of a regression of Leverage (or, item #9 
item #6) on Tangibility. While the magnitude of those regression residuals may be of little economic
interest, they are useful in gauging spare debt capacity in that they can be employed to rank rms
into categories. We proceed in this way, ranking rm-years into a \high" (\low") debt capacity
category if the leverage regression residuals associated with those rm-years fall into the bottom
(top) three deciles of the distribution of the residuals. To check that the results we obtain from this
experiment are economically sensible, we also rank rms into low and high debt capacity according
to their lagged, raw leverage ratios. Both of these rankings are performed on an annual basis.
Table 8 shows what happens when we condition our interactive models on rms' spare debt
capacity. Panel A presents results for the debt capacity sorting scheme that is based on leverage
residuals. Panel B is similarly structured, but high and low debt capacity categories are based on
rankings of raw leverage ratios. Only nancially constrained rms are used to perform our tests,
since only those rms' investment is aected by the credit multiplier. The results presented in Pan-
13In the capital structure literature, Campello (2006) uses a related approach.
27els A and B of Table 8 are remarkably strong and internally consistent. They show that, among
constrained rms, the credit multiplier reported in previous tables (e.g., Table 5) is strongest across
rms with high debt capacity, and nonexistent across rms with low debt capacity. This is exactly
what one should expect given the dynamics of the credit multiplier implied by our theory.
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4.2.2 Debt Taking
We argue that asset tangibility magnies the impact of investment opportunities on observed in-
vestment spending through a nancing channel. This happens because of a feedback eect between
investment and nancing in the presence of nancing constraints | our theory predicts that the
two processes should move in tandem. We empirically test this logic by turning to rms' debt
taking behavior. We do so in a regression framework in which debt taking (DebtIssuance) is on
the left-hand side, while on the right-hand side we include the set of drivers we used for tests on
investment. This empirical specication is represented by Eq. (34) above.
Table 9 reveals several interesting aspects of our debt taking tests. First, as reported by prior
studies, leverage is negatively associated with Q and positively associated with Tangibility. Second,
the estimates for tangibility interacted with Q substantiate the dynamics of our credit multiplier:
(1) constrained rms take on more debt in response to increases in investment opportunities when
their assets are more tangible; (2) unconstrained rms' investment is unaected by the credit multi-
plier eect. The results for the debt taking model provides further evidence that Tangibility and Q
jointly inuence investment spending via a nancing channel in the presence of credit imperfections.
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Before concluding, it is worth noting that the results in Table 9 suggest that rms with very
high asset tangibility (above the 75th percentile of the distribution of Tangibility) observe no direct
relation between Q and DebtIssuance | i.e., the Q-interaction term dominates the Q-intercept
term. Notably, this is similar to the relation between Q and DebtIssuance across nancially uncon-
strained rms. At lower levels of Tangibility, however, increases in Q are met with sharp declines
in debt. These ndings are at the very heart of the impact of nancing constraints on corporate
policies. Our estimates imply that contracting imperfections can lead to a negative association
between investment opportunities and external nancing, but that this adverse eect can be at-
tenuated by variables that enhance the contracting environment, such as asset tangibility. This
rm-level eect is similar to the arguments made by Bernanke et al. (1996, 2000) in their pioneer-
ing work on the credit multiplier in the aggregate economy. These authors argue that the impact
of nancing imperfections stemming from agency problems and asymmetric information issues are
minimized when rms have enough collateral. In that case, rms borrow from the capital markets
whenever they are hit by positive innovations in investment opportunities. As collateral values
28drop, however, nancing frictions become more relevant. Firms with good prospects (higher Q)
then shy away from borrowing funds in the credit markets.
5 Concluding Remarks
We model the eect of asset tangibility and nancing constraints when nancing and investment
are jointly determined. For nancially constrained rms, acquiring assets that can be used as col-
lateral alleviates ex post hold-up problems and hence enlarges ex ante debt capacity. This, in turn,
speeds up investment timing. Our model predicts that nancially constrained rms with more
tangible assets invest more and borrow more in response to positive shocks due to an endogenous
nancing{investment feedback eect that propagates across time | the rm-level credit multiplier.
Our model's central insights guide us in conducting empirical tests to shed new light on the
relation between investment spending and Q. More specically, while both Q and tangibility are
expected to explain the rm's investment, the credit multiplier predicts that the interaction of these
two variables should have an even stronger impact on investment in the cross-section of nancially
constrained rms. Based on a large sample of manufacturers over the 1971{2005 period, a variety
of tests strongly support our theory's predictions. Consistent with our identication strategy, we
show also that the credit multiplier is absent from samples of nancially unconstrained rms and
nancially constrained rms with low incremental debt capacity. Finally, estimation results on debt
issuance as a function of Q, tangibility, and Q interacted with tangibility lend further support to our
rm-level credit multiplier eect. In particular, when rms are nancially constrained, they take on
more debt in response to increases in investment opportunities when their assets are more tangible.
The set of results generated by this study suggests that further extension of this research agenda
may prove fruitful. More generally, our ndings indicate that contracting imperfections may have
important, yet understudied implications for corporate nancial decisions. In future research, it
would be interesting to examine whether the time-varying quality of collateral or the exposure to
business cycle dynamics can, for example, explain dierences in the complexity and evolution of debt
structures and nancial leverage ratios over time, and across rms. Likewise, it would be interesting
to examine whether collateral alleviates external contracting problems in ways that aect various
nancial policies of the rm (such as cash management, dividend distributions, and leases).
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This appendix contains the results of tests using the second measure of tangibility, which we do
not tabulate in the paper. The proxy we use is an industry-level, time-variant proxy that gauges
the ease with which lenders can liquidate a rm's productive capital. In particular, we measure
asset redeployability using the ratio of used to total (i.e., used plus new) xed depreciable capital
expenditures in an industry. The proxy captures the idea that the degree of activity in asset resale
markets (i.e., demand for second-hand capital) aects nancial contractibility. To construct the
intended measure, starting from 1981, we hand-collect data for used and new capital acquisitions
at the four-digit SIC level from the Bureau of Census' Annual Survey of the Manufacturers. Data
on plant and equipment acquisitions are compiled by the Bureau every year, but the last survey
identifying both used and new capital acquisitions was published in 1996. Besides the shorter time
coverage, we note that estimations based on this measure of asset tangibility use smaller sample
sizes because not all of COMPUSTAT's SIC codes are present in the Census data. To make the
results in this appendix easily comparable to the ones in the paper, we use the corresponding table
numbers from the paper in this appendix (i.e., the base regression results are in Table 4-A and
the credit multiplier regression results are in Table 5-A). Moreover, we tabulate a few unreported
robustness tests using the paper's primary measure of tangibility, which is an annual, rm-level
proxy for expected value of assets in liquidation, in Tables 6-A, 7-A, and 8-A.
30Table 4-A. Investment Spending, Q, and Asset Tangibility: Base Regressions
This table displays OLS-FE (rm- and year-xed eects) estimation results of the base investment model (omitting
the Q-interactive term from Eq. (31) in the text). The estimations in Panel A use pre-determined rm selection into
\nancially constrained" and \nancially unconstrained" categories. Constraint category assignments use ex-ante
criteria based on rm dividend payout, asset size, bond ratings, and commercial paper ratings. In Panel B, switching
regression estimations allow for endogenous selection into \nancially constrained" and \nancially unconstrained"
categories via maximum likelihood methods. The\regime selection" regression (unreported) uses payout ratio, asset
size, a dummy for bond ratings, a dummy for commercial paper ratings, and Tangibility as selection variables to
classify rms into constraint categories (see text for details). Investment is the ratio of xed capital expenditures
(item #128) over lagged xed capital stock (item #8). Q is computed as the market value of assets divided by the
book value of assets, or (item #6 + (item #24  item #25) { item #60 { item #74) / (item #6). Tangibility is an
annual, industry-level measure of asset redeployment; available from 1981 through 1996 (data taken from the Bureau
of Census' Annual Survey of Manufacturers). All rm data are collected from COMPUSTAT's annual industrial
tapes over the 1971{2005 period. All rm data are collected from COMPUSTAT's annual industrial tapes over the
1971{2005 period. The sample rms are from manufacturing industries (SICs 2000{3999). The estimations correct
the error structure for heteroskedasticity and clustering using the White-Huber estimator. Robust standard errors
reported in parentheses.
Panel A: Exogenous Financial Constraint Categorizations (Ex-Ante Classications)
Dependent Variable Independent Variables R2 Obs.
Investment Q Tangibility
1. Payout Policy
Constrained Firms 0.1958*** 0.1459* 0.05 5,795
(0.0191) (0.0847)
Unconstrained Firms 0.0978*** {0.0743* 0.03 3,509
(0.0145) (0.0431)
2. Firm Size
Constrained Firms 0.1840*** 0.2148* 0.04 3,715
(0.0268) (0.1127)
Unconstrained Firms 0.1173*** {0.0677 0.05 3,470
(0.0152) (0.0463)
3. Bond Ratings
Constrained Firms 0.1670*** 0.1604*** 0.05 10,744
(0.0142) (0.0531)
Unconstrained Firms 0.1793*** {0.0438 0.05 1,779
(0.0299) (0.0696)
4. Comm. Paper Ratings
Constrained Firms 0.1685*** 0.1505*** 0.05 11,874
(0.0140) (0.0489)
Unconstrained Firms 0.1487*** {0.1116 0.08 649
(0.0434) (0.0797)
Panel B: Endogenous Financial Constraint Categorizations (Switching Regressions)
Dependent Variable Independent Variables R2 Obs.
Investment Q Tangibility
Constrained Firms 0.2779*** 0.1511*** 0.11 9,522
(0.0588) (0.0573)
Unconstrained Firm 0.1281*** 0.0263 0.05 9,522
(0.0129) (0.0334)
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical signicance at the 1-, 5-, and 10-percent (two-tail) test levels, respectively.
31Table 5-A. Investment Spending, Q, and Asset Tangibility: The Credit Multiplier
Eect Using Ex-Ante Constraint Partitions
This table displays OLS-FE (rm- and year-xed eects) estimation results of the credit multiplier investment model
(Eq. (31) in the text). The estimations in Panel A use pre-determined rm selection into \nancially constrained" and
\nancially unconstrained" categories. Constraint category assignments use ex-ante criteria based on rm dividend
payout, asset size, bond ratings, and commercial paper ratings. In Panel B, switching regression estimations allow for
endogenous selection into \nancially constrained" and \nancially unconstrained" categories via maximum likelihood
methods. The\regime selection" regression (unreported) uses payout ratio, asset size, a dummy for bond ratings, a
dummy for commercial paper ratings, and Tangibility as selection variables to classify rms into constraint categories
(see text for details). Investment is the ratio of xed capital expenditures (item #128) over lagged xed capital
stock (item #8). Q is computed as the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets, or (item #6 +
(item #24  item #25) { item #60 { item #74) / (item #6). Tangibility is an annual, industry-level measure
of asset redeployment; available from 1981 through 1996 (data taken from the Bureau of Census' Annual Survey of
Manufacturers). All rm data are collected from COMPUSTAT's annual industrial tapes over the 1971{2005 period.
The sample rms are from manufacturing industries (SICs 2000{3999). The estimations correct the error structure for
heteroskedasticity and clustering using the White-Huber estimator. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
Panel A: Exogenous Financial Constraint Categorizations (Ex-Ante Classications)
Dependent Variable Independent Variables R2 Obs.
Investment Q Tangibility Q  Tangibility
1. Payout Policy
Constrained Firms 0.0832*** {0.0819 0.5800*** 0.05 5,795
(0.0210) (0.2610) (0.2186)
Unconstrained Firms 0.0941*** {0.1651 0.1269 0.03 3,509
(0.0161) (0.1506) (0.2034)
2. Firm Size
Constrained Firms 0.0488*** {0.4246 0.8431*** 0.05 3,715
(0.0206) (0.3025) (0.2386)
Unconstrained Firms 0.1091*** {0.3011 0.2966 0.05 3,470
(0.0164) ( 0.1997) (0.2584)
3. Bond Ratings
Constrained Firms 0.0480*** {0.3033* 0.4689** 0.05 10,744
(0.0148) (0.1686) (0.2223)
Unconstrained Firms 0.1764*** {0.0953 0.0624 0.05 1,779
(0.0323) (0.1959) (0.2534)
4. Comm. Paper Ratings
Constrained Firms 0.0511*** {0.2807* 0.4218** 0.05 11,874
(0.0146) (0.0125) (0.2068)
Unconstrained Firms 0.1457*** {0.1823 0.0927 0.08 649
(0.0441) (0.4421) (0.6253)
Panel B: Endogenous Financial Constraint Categorizations (Switching Regressions)
Dependent Variable Independent Variables R2 Obs.
Investment Q Tangibility Q  Tangibility
Constrained Firms 0.1098*** {0.1310 0.4048*** 0.05 9,522
(0.0134) (0.1160) (0.1484)
Unconstrained Firm 0.2935*** {0.2796 {0.2334 0.11 9,522
(0.0814) (0.2891) (0.7777)
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical signicance at the 1-, 5-, and 10-percent (two-tail) test levels, respectively.
32Table 6-A. Investment Spending, Q, and Asset Tangibility: The Credit Multiplier
Eect Using GMM Estimations
This table displays GMM-FE (rm- and year-xed eects) estimation results of the credit multiplier investment
model (Eq. (31) in the text). The estimations use pre-determined rm selection into \nancially constrained" and
\nancially unconstrained" categories. Constraint category assignments use ex-ante criteria based on rm dividend
payout, asset size, bond ratings, and commercial paper ratings (see text for details). Investment is the ratio of xed
capital expenditures (item #128) over lagged xed capital stock (item #8). Q is computed as the market value
of assets divided by the book value of assets, or (item #6 + (item #24  item #25) { item #60 { item #74) /
(item #6). Tangibility is an annual, rm-level proxy for expected value of assets in liquidation (the computation
follows Berger et al. (1996)). The instruments include lags 1 through 3 of the model's dierenced right-hand side
variables. All rm data are collected from COMPUSTAT's annual industrial tapes over the 1971{2005 period. The
sample rms are from manufacturing industries (SICs 2000{3999). The estimations correct the error structure for
heteroskedasticity and clustering using the White-Huber estimator. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
Diagnostic statistics for instrument overidentication restrictions (p-values for Hansen's J-statistics) and instrument
relevance (rst-stage F-statistics' p-values) are also reported.
Dependent Variable Independent Variables P-Value of P-Value of
Investment Q Tangibility Q  Tangibility Hansen's First-Stage
J-statistic F-Test
1. Payout Policy
Constrained Firms {0.4064** {0.3889 0.9699*** 0.58 0.00
(0.2055) (0.2816) (0.3407)
Unconstrained Firms 0.2091 0.0663 {0.0418 0.83 0.00
(0.3174) (0.4557) (0.5428)
2. Firm Size
Constrained Firms {0.3934** {0.1949 0.7940*** 0.20 0.00
(0.1847) (0.2365) (0.3085)
Unconstrained Firms 0.2875 0.2067 {0.1501 0.92 0.00
(0.3858) (0.6083) (0.6678)
3. Bond Ratings
Constrained Firms {0.3009** {0.4071** 0.7964*** 0.88 0.00
(0.1402) (0.1927) (0.2379)
Unconstrained Firms 0.1181 {0.0978 0.2431 0.22 0.00
(0.3196) (0.5197) (0.5881)
4. Comm. Paper Ratings
Constrained Firms {0.3330** {0.4649** 0.8509*** 0.96 0.00
(0.1439) (0.1990) (0.2437)
Unconstrained Firms 0.3489 0.1171 {0.1239 0.33 0.00
(0.2962) (0.4907) (0.5224)
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical signicance at the 1-, 5-, and 10-percent (two-tail) test levels, respectively.
33Table 7-A. Investment Spending, Q, and Asset Tangibility: The Credit Multiplier
Eect Replacing Q with the Projection of Q on Industry Prices
This table displays OLS-FE (rm- and year-xed eects) estimation results of the credit multiplier investment model
(Eq. (31) in the text), where conventional Q is replaced by the projection of Q on industry-level PPI (from the
Bureau of Labor Statisticcs). This construct is denoted ProjQ. The estimations use pre-determined rm selec-
tion into \nancially constrained" and \nancially unconstrained" categories. Constraint category assignments use
ex-ante criteria based on rm dividend payout, size, bond ratings, and commercial paper ratings (see text for de-
tails). Investment is the ratio of xed capital expenditures (item #128) over lagged xed capital stock (item #8).
Tangibility is an annual, rm-level proxy for expected value of assets in liquidation (the computation follows Berger
et al. (1996)). All rm data are collected from COMPUSTAT's annual industrial tapes. The sample rms are from
manufacturing industries (SICs 2000{3999). While for most industries the PPI series compilations start in the 1970's,
for many it starts in the mid-1980's. All of the PPI series end in 2003. The estimations correct the error structure for
heteroskedasticity and clustering using the White-Huber estimator. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
Dependent Variable Independent Variables R2 Obs.
Investment ProjQ Tangibility ProjQ
Tangibility
1. Payout Policy
Constrained Firms 0.9459*** 0.0505 0.6176*** 0.04 19,305
(0.1409) (0.1403) (0.1756)
Unconstrained Firms 0.3444*** 0.0073 0.1187 0.00 14,869
(0.1083) (0.0817) (0.1032)
2. Firm Size
Constrained Firms 0.6305*** 0.2238 0.4859* 0.04 12,395
(0.1980) (0.2139) (0.2612)
Unconstrained Firms 0.5318*** 0.0676 0.1167 0.02 14,979
(0.0955) (0.0695) (0.0877)
3. Bond Ratings
Constrained Firms 0.4962*** 0.1112 0.4109*** 0.03 37,160
(0.0910) (0.0888) (0.1101)
Unconstrained Firms 0.4951*** 0.0503 0.1307 0.01 9,348
(0.1449) (0.1141) (0.1401)
4. Comm. Paper Ratings
Constrained Firms 0.4960*** 0.1100 0.3717*** 0.03 42,854
(0.0848) (0.0793) (0.0987)
Unconstrained Firms 0.4792*** 0.0277 0.0606 0.02 3,654
(0.1829) (0.1223) (0.1539)
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical signicance at the 1-, 5-, and 10-percent (two-tail) test levels, respectively.
34Table 8-A. Investment Spending, Q, and Asset Tangibility: The Credit Multiplier
Eect Replacing Investment Levels with Investment Growth Rates
This table displays OLS-FE (rm- and year-xed eects) estimation results of the credit multiplier invest-
ment model (Eq. (31) in the text), where investment level (Investmet) is replaced by investment growth rate
(Log(Capext=Capext 1)) as the left-hand side variable. The estimations use pre-determined rm selection into
\nancially constrained" and \nancially unconstrained" categories. Constraint category assignments use ex-ante
criteria based on rm dividend payout, size, bond ratings, and commercial paper ratings (see text for details). Capex
is item #128. Q is computed as the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets, or (item #6 + (item
#24  item #25) { item #60 { item #74) / (item #6). Tangibility is an annual, rm-level proxy for expected value of
assets in liquidation (the computation follows Berger et al. (1996)). All rm data are collected from COMPUSTAT's
annual industrial tapes. The sample rms are from manufacturing industries (SICs 2000{3999). The estimations
correct the error structure for heteroskedasticity and clustering using the White-Huber estimator. Robust standard
errors reported in parentheses.
Dependent Variable Independent Variables R2 Obs.
Log(Capext=Capext 1) Q Tangibility Q  Tangibility
1. Payout Policy
Constrained Firms {0.0410 0.6789*** 0.2950*** 0.02 22,399
(0.0724) (0.1200) (0.1104)
Unconstrained Firms 0.1671*** 0.5381*** {0.1681* 0.01 17,884
(0.0611) (0.1195) (0.1022)
2. Firm Size
Constrained Firms {0.2405** 0.6275*** 0.5127*** 0.01 15,170
(0.0940) (0.1532) (0.1438)
Unconstrained Firms 0.3375*** 0.7926*** {0.4154*** 0.01 17,913
(0.0715) (0.1272) (0.1210)
3. Bond Ratings
Constrained Firms {0.0342 0.6614*** 0.2012** 0.01 45,038
(0.0518) (0.0898) (0.0829)
Unconstrained Firms 0.3722*** 0.8368*** {0.4540** 0.01 11,050
(0.1261) (0.2088) (0.2211)
4. Comm. Paper Ratings
Constrained Firms {0.0065 0.6466*** 0.1606** 0.01 51,696
(0.0498) (0.0850) (0.0798)
Unconstrained Firms 0.3127** 0.6251*** {0.3469 0.01 4,392
(0.1332) (0.2084) (0.2227)
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical signicance at the 1-, 5-, and 10-percent (two-tail) test levels, respectively.
35Appendix B
This appendix establishes that coecient estimates of an interaction term that contains one (or
even two) mismeasured variables are also biased towards zero, so a measurement problem in Q
would make it harder for our tests to nd the eect of the credit multiplier via the QTangibility
interaction term. In other words, we examine the eect of mismeasurement on coecient estimates
returned for Q interacted with Tangibility by employing Monte Carlo experiments.
In a rst set of experiments, we simulate our interactive model considering the case in which
only one right-hand side variable is measured with error. That is, we consider:
Investmenti;t = 0 + 1Qi;t 1 + 2Tangibilityi;t 1 + 3 (Q  Tangibility)i;t 1 + ei;t; (39)
where ei;t is i:i:d: and the observable variable Q is mismeasured. In particular,
Qi;t = Q
i;t + "i;t; (40)
where Q is the unobservable, true variable, and the measurement error "i;t is i:i:d: and independent
of ei;t. This specication is equivalent to assuming cov(Q
i;t;"i;t) = 0 and cov (Qi;t;"i;t) = var("i;t),
which corresponds to the classical errors-in-variables problem.
To study the potential bias in estimates of 3 (the credit multiplier eect) due to measurement
error in Q, we consider three dierent distributions for innovations (ei;"i)
0
: (1) a standard nor-
mal distribution, (2) a log-normal distribution, and (3) a chi-square distribution with 3 degrees of
freedom. Without loss of generality, we normalize the simulated parameter values of i to unity
for all i 2 f0;1;2;3g. To allow for various correlation structures, we generate random samples
of Q and Tangibility from the above distributions, multiply the resulting vectors by the matrix
cov(Q;Tangibility), and generate Q  Tangibility. We use four alternative correlation matrices,
where the diagonal elements are equal to 1 and o-diagonal elements equal to 0, 0.25, 0.5, and 0.75.
We perform simulations for various sample sizes. Since the estimation results are qualitatively
similar across dierent sample sizes, we tabulate the result for n = 500 (results for other sample
sizes are available upon request). For each simulation the number of repetitions is 10,000.
Table 9-A. Mismeasurement in Q
Correlation Structure
Distribution 0 0.25 0.5 0.75
1 0.4996 0.4518 0.3093 0.1097
Normal 2 1.0024 1.2580 1.5519 1.8540
3 0.4994 0.5640 0.6699 0.7501
1 0.5043 {0.4706 {1.2694 {2.2365
Log-normal 2 0.9950 0.6526 1.6451 3.2811
3 0.5007 0.9230 0.9598 0.9431
1 0.4995 {0.3904 {1.8363 {3.5637
Chi-square 2 0.9952 1.5044 2.8623 5.3707
3 0.5003 0.7052 0.8072 0.8192
36Table 9-A collects the least squares estimates based on our simulated data. The table shows that
the coecients involving Q are likely biased in the presence of mismeasurement. Crucially, however,
Table 9-A shows that the observed biases work against nding evidence for our credit multiplier
theory. In particular: (1) as expected, the estimates of 1 are biased downwardly; (2) notably,
estimates of 3 are also biased downwardly; and (3) the estimates of 2 could be downwardly or
upwardly biased, depending on the assumed correlation structure.
In a second set of experiments, we examine the case in which two explanatory variables are
mismeasured. That is, both Q and Tangibility suer from measurement error. To handle this more
general case, we incorporate another mismeasurement equation into the simulation framework; that
is, the simulated data is now generated by equations (39), (40), and
Tangibilityi;t = Tangibility
i;t + i;t; (41)
where Tangibility is the additional unobservable variable, and the additional measurement error
i is i:i:d: and independent of ei and "i.
Table 10-A summarizes our ndings for the second set of Monte Carlo experiments. The es-
timation results for the case when Q and Tangibility are imprecisely measured are qualitatively
similar to the ones for the case when only Q is measured with error. The main dierence between
the two sets of results is that estimates of 2 are now, as expected, also downwardly biased.
Table 10-A. Mismeasurement in Q and Tangibility
Correlation Structure
Distribution 0 0.25 0.5 0.75
1 0.5009 0.6100 0.6921 0.7539
Normal 2 0.4997 0.6096 0.6918 0.7525
3 0.2499 0.3058 0.4217 0.5318
1 0.5075 {0.9881 {1.7457 {1.9533
Log-normal 2 0.4978 {1.0091 {1.7624 {1.9655
3 0.2498 0.8279 1.0075 1.0499
1 0.5010 {0.2923 {1.5517 {2.2807
Chi-square 2 0.4968 {0.2915 {1.5593 {2.2929
3 0.2500 0.5076 0.7473 0.8691
The above simulations have shown that the coecients of interest for our tests are biased
downward when there are measurement errors in one or two of the explanatory variables of our
main regression specication (Eq. (31)). More concretely, they indicate that mismeasurement in Q
and/or Tangibility also lead to an attenuation bias in the coecient returned for the interactive
term Q  Tangibility. Altogether, these potential biases make it more dicult for one to detect a
signicant role for our credit multiplier theory in the data.
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39Table 1. Base and Credit Multiplier Regressions on Simulated Data
This table displays (average) OLS estimation results of the base investment model (omitting the Q-interactive term
from Eq. (31)) in Panel A and the credit multiplier investment model (Eq. (31) in the text) in Panel B for 200
simulated panels of 600 model rms over 35 years. The estimation results in Panels A.1 and B.1 use linear issuance
costs to assign rms into \nancially constrained" and \nancially unconstrained" categories. The estimation results
in Panels A.2 and B.2 use linear-quadratic issuance costs to assign rms into \nancially constrained" and \nancially
unconstrained" categories. Investment is the ratio of the number of investment points reached by a rm over the
book value of assets, K. That is, the cumulative counter of a rm starting at X and reaching an investment point, ^ X,
the rst time from below and then being replaced by a replica of itself starting out again at X with the counter being
moved up by one. Q is computed as rm value F
() divided by the book value of assets, K. Tangibility is specied
by the set  2 f0:025;0:05;:::;0:725;0:75g scaled by K, which provides a step size of 2.5% and yields 30 \tangibility
cases." In each of the 200 panels, we use 20 rms per case and hence obtain 600 rms, which we follow for 70 years
at a quarterly frequency. As we drop the rst 35 years from each panel and transform the quarterly data into annual
(year-end) data, we end up with 21,000 rm-year observations per panel. The estimations correct the error structure
for heteroskedasticity using the White estimator. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
Panel A: Base Regressions
Dependent Variable Independent Variables
Investment Q Tangibility R2 Obs.
A.1 Linear Issuance costs
Constrained Firms 0.1035*** 0.0946*** 0.16 21,000
(0.0036) (0.0187)
Unconstrained Firms 0.1204*** 0.0041 0.17 21,000
(0.0040) (0.0204)
A.2 Linear-Quadratic Issuance costs
Constrained Firms 0.0970*** 0.1326*** 0.15 21,000
(0.0034) (0.0181)
Unconstrained Firms 0.1169*** 0.0249 0.17 21,000
(0.0039) (0.0199)
Panel B: Credit Multiplier Regressions
Dependent Variable Independent Variables
Investment Q Tangibility Q  Tangibility R2 Obs.
B.1 Linear Issuance costs
Constrained Firms 0.0764*** 0.0177 0.7246*** 0.16 21,000
(0.0064) (0.0167) (0.1614)
Unconstrained Firms 0.1177*** -0.0022 0.0615 0.17 21,000
(0.0081) (0.0183) (0.1836)
B.2 Linear-Quadratic Issuance costs
Constrained Firms 0.0609*** 0.0249 0.9925*** 0.16 21,000
(0.0057) (0.0161) (0.1528)
Unconstrained Firms 0.1087*** 0.0037 0.1257 0.17 21,000
(0.0077) (0.0179) (0.1782)
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical signicance at the 1-, 5-, and 10-percent (two-tail) test levels, respectively.
40Table 2. Sample Descriptive Statistics
This table displays summary statistics for the main variables used in the empirical estimations. All rm data
are collected from COMPUSTAT's annual industrial tapes over the 1971{2005 period. The sample rms are from
manufacturing industries (SICs 2000{3999). Assets is the rm's total assets (COMSPUSTAT's item #6), expressed
in millions of CPI-adjusted 1971 dollars. Investment is the ratio of xed capital expenditures (item #128) over
lagged xed capital stock (item #8). Q is computed as the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets,
or (item #6 + (item #24  item #25) { item #60 { item #74) / (item #6). Tangibility is the expected value of
assets in liquidation (the computation follows Berger et al. (1996)). Leverage is computed as item #9 divided by
item #6. DebtIssuance is the change in long- (item #9) and short-term debt (item #34) over lagged total assets.
Variables Statistics
Mean Median Std. Dev. 25th Pct. 75th Pct. Obs.
Assets 155.6 14.1 690.2 4.3 60.8 65,107
Investment 0.2617 0.1884 0.2584 0.1159 0.3088 58,633
Q 0.8733 0.7695 0.5196 0.6355 0.9494 65,107
Tangibility 0.5583 0.5648 0.1196 0.5035 0.6118 64,788
Leverage 0.1713 01404 0.1655 0.0377 0.2573 64,788
DebtIssuance 0.0015 {0.0079 0.1449 {0.0485 0.0242 57,087
41Table 3. Cross-Classication of Financial Constraint Types
This table displays rm-year cross-classications for the various criteria used to categorize rms as either nancially
constrained or unconstrained (see text for denitions). To ease visualization, we assign the letter (C) for constrained
rms and (U) for unconstrained rms in each row/column. All rm data are collected from COMPUSTAT's annual
industrial tapes over the 1971{2005 period. The sample rms are from manufacturing industries (SICs 2000{3999).
Financial Constraints Criteria Div. Payout Firm Size Bond Ratings CP Ratings
(C) (U) (C) (U) (C) (U) (C) (U)
1. Payout Policy
Constrained Firms (C) 27,658
Unconstrained Firms (U) 19,549
2. Firm Size
Constrained Firms (C) 12,857 2,750 19,550
Unconstrained Firms (U) 3,689 9,849 19,549
3. Bond Ratings
Constrained Firms (C) 23,723 14,786 19,108 11,391 52,915
Unconstrained Firms (U) 3,935 4,763 442 8,158 12,192
4. Comm. Paper Ratings
Constrained Firms (C) 26,964 16,896 19,533 15,106 52,822 7,571 60,393
Unconstrained Firms (U) 694 2,653 17 4,443 93 4,621 4,714
42Table 4. Investment Spending, Q, and Asset Tangibility: Base Regressions
This table displays OLS-FE (rm- and year-xed eects) estimation results of the base investment model (omitting
the Q-interactive term from Eq. (31) in the text). The estimations in Panel A use pre-determined rm selection into
\nancially constrained" and \nancially unconstrained" categories. Constraint category assignments use ex-ante
criteria based on rm dividend payout, asset size, bond ratings, and commercial paper ratings. In Panel B, switching
regression estimations allow for endogenous selection into \nancially constrained" and \nancially unconstrained"
categories via maximum likelihood methods. The\regime selection" regression (unreported) uses payout ratio, asset
size, a dummy for bond ratings, a dummy for commercial paper ratings, and Tangibility as selection variables to
classify rms into constraint categories (see text for details). Investment is the ratio of xed capital expenditures
(item #128) over lagged xed capital stock (item #8). Q is computed as the market value of assets divided by the
book value of assets, or (item #6 + (item #24  item #25) { item #60 { item #74) / (item #6). Tangibility is an
annual, rm-level proxy for expected value of assets in liquidation (the computation follows Berger et al. (1996)). All
rm data are collected from COMPUSTAT's annual industrial tapes over the 1971{2005 period. The sample rms are
from manufacturing industries (SICs 2000{3999). The estimations correct the error structure for heteroskedasticity
and clustering using the White-Huber estimator. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
Panel A: Exogenous Financial Constraint Categorizations (Ex-Ante Classications)
Dependent Variable Independent Variables R2 Obs.
Investment Q Tangibility
1. Payout Policy
Constrained Firms 0.1284*** 0.5605*** 0.07 22,512
(0.0088) (0.0328)
Unconstrained Firms 0.0605*** 0.0891* 0.02 17,915
(0.0065) (0.0458)
2. Firm Size
Constrained Firms 0.1090*** 0.6491*** 0.06 17,259
(0.0104) (0.0455)
Unconstrained Firms 0.0663*** 0.1557*** 0.05 17,949
(0.0073) (0.0235)
3. Bond Ratings
Constrained Firms 0.0940*** 0.4251*** 0.05 45,226
(0.0056) (0.0252)
Unconstrained Firms 0.0804*** 0.0787** 0.03 11,051
(0.0104) (0.0321)
4. Comm. Paper Ratings
Constrained Firms 0.0939*** 0.3978** 0.05 51,893
(0.0055) (0.0229)
Unconstrained Firms 0.0780*** 0.0857 0.06 4,384
(0.0097) (0.0574)
Panel B: Endogenous Financial Constraint Categorizations (Switching Regressions)
Dependent Variable Independent Variables R2 Obs.
Investment Q Tangibility
Constrained Firms 0.0708*** 0.2906*** 0.05 56,252
(0.0039) (0.0153)
Unconstrained Firms 0.0842*** 0.1315 0.02 56,252
(0.0150) (0.1376)
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical signicance at the 1-, 5-, and 10-percent (two-tail) test levels, respectively.
43Table 5. Investment Spending, Q, and Asset Tangibility: The Credit Multiplier Eect
This table displays OLS-FE (rm- and year-xed eects) estimation results of the credit multiplier investment model
(Eq. (31) in the text). The estimations in Panel A use pre-determined rm selection into \nancially constrained" and
\nancially unconstrained" categories. Constraint category assignments use ex-ante criteria based on rm dividend
payout, asset size, bond ratings, and commercial paper ratings. In Panel B, switching regression estimations allow for
endogenous selection into \nancially constrained" and \nancially unconstrained" categories via maximum likelihood
methods. The\regime selection" regression (unreported) uses payout ratio, asset size, a dummy for bond ratings, a
dummy for commercial paper ratings, and Tangibility as selection variables to classify rms into constraint categories
(see text for details). Investment is the ratio of xed capital expenditures (item #128) over lagged xed capital
stock (item #8). Q is computed as the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets, or (item #6
+ (item #24  item #25) { item #60 { item #74) / (item #6). Tangibility is an annual, rm-level proxy for
expected value of assets in liquidation (the computation follows Berger et al. (1996)). All rm data are collected
from COMPUSTAT's annual industrial tapes over the 1971{2005 period. The sample rms are from manufacturing
industries (SICs 2000{3999). The estimations correct the error structure for heteroskedasticity and clustering using
the White-Huber estimator. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
Panel A: Exogenous Financial Constraint Categorizations (Ex-Ante Classications)
Dependent Variable Independent Variables R2 Obs.
Investment Q Tangibility Q  Tangibility
Financial Constraints Criteria
1. Payout Policy
Constrained Firms 0.0285 0.4214*** 0.1571*** 0.07 22,512
(0.0310) (0.0525) ( 0.0505)
Unconstrained Firms 0.1139*** 0.1656*** {0.0884* 0.02 17,915
(0.0312) (0.0510) (0.0524)
2. Firm Size
Constrained Firms 0.0165 0.5264*** 0.1421** 0.07 17,259
(0.0423) (0.0693) (0.0692)
Unconstrained Firms 0.1311*** 0.2572*** {0.1099** 0.05 17,949
(0.0290) (0.0521) (0.0526)
3. Bond Ratings
Constrained Firms 0.0196 0.3239*** 0.1177*** 0.05 45,226
(0.0244) (0.0400) (0.0408)
Unconstrained Firms 0.1357*** 0.2664*** {0.0962 0.03 11,051
(0.0486) (0.0844) (0.0869)
4. Comm. Paper Ratings
Constrained Firms 0.0247 0.3026*** 0.1101*** 0.05 51,893
(0.0236) (0.0382) (0.0393)
Unconstrained Firms 0.1691*** 0.2377*** {0.1596** 0.06 4,384
(0.0470) (0.0743) (0.0786)
Panel B: Endogenous Financial Constraint Categorizations (Switching Regressions)
Dependent Variable Independent Variables R2 Obs.
Investment Q Tangibility Q  Tangibility
Constrained Firms 0.1723* 0.1965 0.3996*** 0.04 56,252
(0.0911) (0.1865) (0.1339)
Unconstrained Firms 0.0308* 0.2305*** 0.0601 0.05 56,252
(0.0171) (0.0267) (0.0393)
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical signicance at the 1-, 5-, and 10-percent (two-tail) test levels, respectively.
44Table 6. Investment Spending, Q, and Asset Tangibility: The Credit Multiplier Eect
Replacing Q with RealQ
This table displays OLS-FE (rm- and year-xed eects) estimation results of the credit multiplier investment model
(Eq. (31) in the text), where conventional Q is replaced by Cummins et al.'s (2006) measurement-robust RealQ
(based on long-term earning forecasts from IBES). The estimations use pre-determined rm selection into \nancially
constrained" and \nancially unconstrained" categories. Constraint category assignments use ex-ante criteria based
on rm dividend payout, asset size, bond ratings, and commercial paper ratings (see text for details). Investment
is the ratio of xed capital expenditures (item #128) over lagged xed capital stock (item #8). Tangibility is an
annual, rm-level proxy for expected value of assets in liquidation (the computation follows Berger et al. (1996)).
All rm data are collected from COMPUSTAT's annual industrial tapes. The sample rms are from manufacturing
industries (SICs 2000{3999). The estimations correct the error structure for heteroskedasticity and clustering using
the White-Huber estimator. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
Dependent Variable Independent Variables R2 Obs.




Constrained Firms {0.0798 0.4653*** 0.1757*** 0.04 2,271
(0.0587) (0.0953) (0.0547)
Unconstrained Firms 0.1153** 0.1199** {0.0479 0.03 3,162
(0.0573) (0.0589) (0.0965)
2. Firm Size
Constrained Firms 0.0314 0.6304*** 0.1343*** 0.03 578
(0.0783) (0.1840) (0.0437)
Unconstrained Firms 0.0017 0.1585*** {0.1294 0.03 3,611
(0.0622) (0.0613) (0.1000)
3. Bond Ratings
Constrained Firms 0.0255 0.2837*** 0.1343** 0.03 5,307
(0.0525) (0.0667) (0.0618)
Unconstrained Firms 0.0068 0.2519*** {0.0568 0.02 1,673
(0.0663) (0.0741) (0.1168)
4. Comm. Paper Ratings
Constrained Firms {0.0169 0.2856*** 0.1191*** 0.03 6,161
(0.0489) (0.0608) (0.0366)
Unconstrained Firms 0.0104 0.1848*** 0.0503 0.03 819
(0.0486) (0.0702) (0.1006)
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical signicance at the 1-, 5-, and 10-percent (two-tail) test levels, respectively.
45Table 7. Investment Spending, Q, and Asset Tangibility: The Credit Multiplier Eect
Including CashFlow
This table displays OLS-FE (rm- and year-xed eects) estimation results of the credit multiplier investment model
(Eq. (31) in the text), with the inclusion of cash ow as a control variable. The estimations use pre-determined rm
selection into \nancially constrained" and \nancially unconstrained" categories. Constraint category assignments
use ex-ante criteria based on rm dividend payout, asset size, bond ratings, and commercial paper ratings (see text for
details). Investment is the ratio of xed capital expenditures (item #128) over lagged xed capital stock (item #8).
Q is computed as the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets, or (item #6 + (item #24  item
#25) { item #60 { item #74) / (item #6). CashFlow is the ratio of operating income (item #18 + item#14) over
lagged xed capital stock. Tangibility is an annual, rm-level proxy for expected value of assets in liquidation (the
computation follows Berger et al. (1996)). All rm data are collected from COMPUSTAT's annual industrial tapes
over the 1971{2005 period. The sample rms are from manufacturing industries (SICs 2000{3999). The estimations
correct the error structure for heteroskedasticity and clustering using the White-Huber estimator. Robust standard
errors reported in parentheses.
Dependent Variable Independent Variables R2 Obs.
Investment Q CashFlow Tangibility Q  Tangibility
Financial Constraints Criteria
1. Payout Policy
Constrained Firms 0.0126 0.0011** 0.3265*** 0.1787*** 0.07 19,956
(0.0322) (0.0005) (0.0545) ( 0.0540)
Unconstrained Firms 0.1097*** 0.0006 0.1626*** {0.0795 0.02 17,103
(0.0363) (0.0014) (0.0569) (0.0608)
2. Firm Size
Constrained Firms 0.0082 0.0099* 0.4032*** 0.1416** 0.05 13,141
(0.0449) (0.0060) (0.0705) (0.0748)
Unconstrained Firms 0.1419*** 0.0020 0.2671*** {0.1233** 0.05 17,105
(0.0268) (0.0024) (0.0477) (0.0473)
3. Bond Ratings
Constrained Firms 0.0334 0.0016* 0.2899*** 0.0902** 0.05 41,230
(0.0256) (0.0009) (0.0410) (0.0431)
Unconstrained Firms 0.1011* 0.0004 0.1881** {0.0241 0.03 10,506
(0.0542) (0.0004) (0.0844) (0.0979)
4. Comm. Paper Ratings
Constrained Firms 0.0365 0.0017* 0.2695*** 0.0867** 0.04 47,522
(0.0245) (0.0010) (0.0394) (0.0416)
Unconstrained Firms 0.1674*** 0.0005 0.2311*** {0.1485* 0.06 4,214
(0.0478) (0.0007) (0.0728) (0.0789)
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical signicance at the 1-, 5-, and 10-percent (two-tail) test levels, respectively.
46Table 8. Investment Spending, Q, and Asset Tangibility: Debt Capacity and the Credit
Multiplier Eect
This table displays OLS-FE (rm- and year-xed eects) estimation results of the credit multiplier investment model
(Eq. (31) in the text), where constrained rms are split into \high" and \low" debt capacity groups. In Panel A,
rms are assigned into high and low debt capacity categories according to annual rankings of the residuals from a
regression of rm leverage on asset tangibility. Low (high) residuals are associated with high (low) incremental debt
capacity. In Panel B, annual rankings based on raw leverage are used. Accordingly, rms ranked at the bottom (top)
of the leverage distribution are considered to have high (low). Investment is the ratio of xed capital expenditures
(item #128) over lagged xed capital stock (item #8). Q is computed as the market value of assets divided by the
book value of assets, or (item #6 + (item #24  item #25) { item #60 { item #74) / (item #6). Tangibility is
an annual, rm-level proxy for expected value of assets in liquidation (the computation follows Berger et al. (1996)).
Leverage is computed as item #9 divided by item #6. All rm data are collected from COMPUSTAT's annual
industrial tapes over the 1971{2005 period. The sample rms are from manufacturing industries (SICs 2000{3999).
The estimations correct the error structure for heteroskedasticity and clustering using the White-Huber estimator.
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
Panel A: Debt capacity rankings based on the residuals from a regression of leverage on asset tangibility
Dependent Variable Independent Variables R2 Obs.
Investment Q Tangibility Q  Tangibility
Financial Constraints Criteria
1. Low Payout Firms
High Debt Capacity {0.0280 0.4258*** 0.2443*** 0.10 6,597
(0.0418) (0.0778) (0.0719)
Low Debt Capacity 0.0674 0.3860*** 0.0341 0.03 8,002
(0.0543) (0.0941) (0.0914)
2. Small Firms
High Debt Capacity 0.0103 0.5727*** 0.1439*** 0.08 5,945
(0.0584) (0.0988) (0.0377)
Low Debt Capacity 0.0354 0.5676*** 0.0739 0.04 3,455
(0.0635) (0.1381) (0.1167)
3. Firms without Bond Ratings
High Debt Capacity 0.0178 0.3544*** 0.0903* 0.06 16,936
(0.0311) (0.0519) (0.0517)
Low Debt Capacity 0.0863 0.4581*** 0.0320 0.04 9,806
(0.0610) (0.1031) (0.1040)
4. Firms without CP Ratings
High Debt Capacity 0.0178 0.3544*** 0.0903* 0.06 16,936
(0.0311) (0.0519) (0.0517)
Low Debt Capacity 0.0919* 0.3522*** 0.0107 0.03 14,784
(0.0492) (0.0819) (0.0848)
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical signicance at the 1-, 5-, and 10-percent (two-tail) test levels, respectively.
47Table 8. { Continued
Panel B: Debt capacity rankings based on the distribution of leverage
Dependent Variable Independent Variables R2 Obs.
Investment Q Tangibility Q  Tangibility
Financial Constraints Criteria
1. Low Payout Firms
High Debt Capacity 0.4092*** {0.4615** 0.4497*** 0.07 5,380
(0.2857) (0.2215) (0.2811)
Low Debt Capacity 0.6424*** 0.1367 0.2384 0.02 7,569
(0.1829) (0.1768) (0.2145)
2. Small Firms
High Debt Capacity 0.5042 0.0051 0.7951** 0.04 4,800
(0.3178) (0.3053) ( 0.3762)
Low Debt Capacity 0.7933** 0.3840 0.1874 0.03 3,376
(0.3151) (0.3367) (0.4030)
3. Firms without Bond Ratings
High Debt Capacity 0.6233*** {0.0507 0.7382*** 0.04 11,202
(0.1767) (0.1751) (0.2174)
Low Debt Capacity 0.7606*** 0.4667** {0.0400 0.02 8,211
(0.2017) (0.2285) (0.2753)
4. Firms without CP Ratings
High Debt Capacity 0.6527*** {0.0681 0.7555*** 0.06 16,936
(0.1724) (0.1619) (0.2022)
Low Debt Capacity 0.6620*** 0.2577 0.0488 0.02 12,115
(0.1564) (0.1571) (0.1901)
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical signicance at the 1-, 5-, and 10-percent (two-tail) test levels, respectively.
48Table 9. Debt Taking, Q, and Asset Tangibility: The Credit Multiplier Eect on Debt
Policy
This table displays OLS-FE (rm- and year-xed eects) estimation results of the credit multiplier debt model (Eq.
(32) in the text). The dependent variable is DebtIssuance, dened as the change in long- (item #9) and short-
term debt (item #34) over lagged total assets. The estimations use pre-determined rm selection into \nancially
constrained" and \nancially unconstrained" categories. Constraint category assignments use ex-ante criteria based
on rm dividend payout, asset size, bond ratings, and commercial paper ratings (see text for details). Investment
is the ratio of xed capital expenditures (item #128) over lagged xed capital stock (item #8). Q is computed as
the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets, or (item #6 + (item #24  item #25) { item #60
{ item #74) / (item #6). Tangibility is an annual, rm-level proxy for expected value of assets in liquidation (the
computation follows Berger et al. (1996)). All rm data are collected from COMPUSTAT's annual industrial tapes
over the 1971{2005 period. The sample rms are from manufacturing industries (SICs 2000{3999). The estimations
correct the error structure for heteroskedasticity and clustering using the White-Huber estimator. Robust standard
errors reported in parentheses.
Dependent Variable Independent Variables R2 Obs.
DebtIssuance Q Tangibility Q  Tangibility
Financial Constraints Criteria
1. Payout Policy
Constrained Firms {0.0523** 0.1342*** 0.0701** 0.01 22,714
(0.0229) (0.0349) (0.0326)
Unconstrained Firms {0.0017 0.0587** {0.0022 0.00 18,108
(0.0236) (0.0286) (0.0369)
2. Firm Size
Constrained Firms {0.0595** 0.1217*** 0.0778** 0.01 15,432
(0.0285) (0.0335) (0.0394)
Unconstrained Firms {0.0057 0.1227*** 0.0041 0.00 18,130
(0.0234) (0.0397) (0.0377)
3. Bond Ratings
Constrained Firms {0.0399* 0.1060*** 0.0501** 0.01 45,644
(0.0224) (0.0269) (0.0224)
Unconstrained Firms 0.1049 {0.0219 0.2082 0.01 11,181
(0.0925) (0.1501) (0.1664)
4. Comm. Paper Ratings
Constrained Firms {0.0434** 0.1049*** 0.0598*** 0.01 52,381
(0.0219) (0.0273) (0.0222)
Unconstrained Firms 0.0878 0.2740* {0.1646 0.01 4,444
(0.1070) (0.1604) (0.1829)
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical signicance at the 1-, 5-, and 10-percent (two-tail) test levels, respectively.
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